926 THE FEDERATIONS AND THE UNION [PART TV 
modelled, the Constitution of the United States. The pro- 
vision for merely absolute majorities, which is borrowed 
from some of the state Constitutions, is a sensible one, and 
avoids the difficulties in finding two-thirds majorities. Then 
the provision for deadlocks is very interesting. It differs 
from the provision in the case of ordinary legislation in 
8. 57 by allowing either House to institute a reform measure, 
and the direct reference to the people is given at an earlier 
stage than the reference by a dissolution in the case of 
ordinary deadlocks. This arrangement is fundamentally 
sound, for the Constitution is essentially a matter for the 
people to decide upon, and therefore there is no ground for 
allowing the Constitution to be kept back from their arbitra- 
tion. Again, the interests of the states are consulted by 
the requirement for a majority in both states alike and in 
electors alike, and this requirement permits any three states 
to block any proposal of constitutional change. The pro- 
vision as to the counting of only half the voters in any 
state where female suffrage existed was due to the fact 
that in 1900 female suffrage was not universal, and has 
become of no importance, since the Federal Franchise Act 
of 1902 made the female suffrage uniform throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
The states are again safeguarded by the special provision 
at the end of the section under which any alteration diminish- 
ing the proportionate representation of any state in either 
House of Parliament or the minimum number of represen- 
tatives of a state in the House of Representatives, or in- 
creasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the 
state, or in any matter affecting the provision of the Consti- 
bution in relation thereto shall become law unless the majority 
of the electors voting in that state approve the proposed law. 
The proviso is well worded to secure that the section itself 
shall not be altered without the consent of the majority of 
the electors of the state. This is due, of course, to the fact 
that in the case of New South Wales the provisions of the 
Constitution of 1855, which required two-thirds majorities for 
certain amendments of the Constitution, were swept away by