1240 ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATION [PART V 
The Secretary of State approved the Bill in a dispatch of 
February 20, 1890. Ie pointed out that in this case, as 
distinct from the New South Wales case, the Bill was passed 
after a general election at which the Bill had been brought 
prominently before some of the constituencies, and that its 
general acceptance throughout Australia was shown by 
similar Bills brought into the Parliaments of New South Wales 
and South Australia, and by the action of all the Australian 
Agents-General, who had called upon him and made represen- 
tations to him of the will of the people of Australia. The 
third condition mentioned in the New South Wales dispatch 
was fulfilled by the adoption of the principle of domicile, and 
he laid stress on the fact that he understood from the Agents- 
General that the addition of the words ‘for two years or 
ipwards’, was not intended to limit the effect of the word 
domicile, but merely to require the further condition that the 
lomicile was bona fide domicile. 
The New South Wales Parliament accordingly re-enacted 
the Bill of 1887 with amendments, and it became law as No. 
37 of 1892, and since then the Colonies of Australia have freely 
legislated on the subject of divorce on the principles laid down, 
viz. the adoption of divorce as resting on domicile, with, how- 
aver, the exception of the deserted wife,! and giving divorce 
for such causes as they deem desirable without reference to 
the backward condition of English law on the topic. But 
Queensland, South and Western Australia. and Tasmania 
still follow the English law. 
It is, however, somewhat doubtful if the harmony of 
legislation is any longer maintained. The New South Wales 
Act No. 14 of 1899 presents a curious series of alternative 
possibilities ; any husband may petition under s.12 in the 
* This principle also applies in Natal under Law No. 18 of 1891 ; see 
Thomas v. Thomas, 23 N. L. R. 38 ; Wright v. Wright, 27 N. L. R. 651; 
Sandberg v. Sandberg, 27 N., L. R. 684. Otherwise the Natal rule is strict ; 
see Steer v. Steer, 16 N. L. R. 237 ; Friedman v. Friedman, 23 N. L. R. 25 ; 
Lea v. Lea, ibid., 91; Htheridge v. Etheridge, ibid., 180; Laughlen v. 
Laughlen, 26 N. L. R. 230. Contra, Thurgood v. Thurgood, 17 N. L. R. 49, 
and of. Mason v. Mason, 4 E. D. C. 330, where a vagabundus is declared 
znable to change his wife's domicile.