1402 THE JUDICIARY [PART VI 
It is the exception which proves the rule ; any arguments 
based upon its existence are arguments for exceptional 
treatment, but they are not reasons for making that treat- 
ment general, and they leave applicable to the bulk of the 
cases the rule which but for the exception would be of uni- 
Yorsal application. The other reasons referred to appear 
to be— 
(I) That the high prerogative in question being personally 
delegated to the Governor, he cannot be in any way relieved 
from the duty of judging for himself in every case in which 
that prerogative is to be exercised, as the responsible minister 
of the Crown in a Colony cannot be looked upon as occupying 
the same position in regard to the Queen’s prerogative of 
pardon as the Home Secretary. The sub-committee would 
in this connexion refer to the views of Council on the general 
question of ministerial powers and responsibilities as ex- 
pressed in the Minute of Council and the report annexed 
thereto,! thinking it needless to restate in detail the position 
taken on the general subject and the argument advanced 
against the proposed division of powers and responsibilities. 
The prerogative of pardon has been rightly vested by 
statute in the Sovereign, since all criminal offences are against 
‘ her peace ’ or ‘ her Crown and dignity ’, and it is reasonable 
that the person injured should have the power to forgive ; 
but neither the punishment of these injuries nor their 
forgiveness (both being matters which affect the people) is 
arbitrary ; the one can be, and accordingly is, regulated by 
law; the other, being mainly beyond the province of law, is 
yet, like the remaining prerogatives of the British Sovereign, 
held in trust for the welfare of the people, and so far as it is 
beyond the province of law is regulated by the general 
principle of the Constitution. 
There may in this, as in other instances, be some difficulty 
in running out an exact analogy between the position in 
Canada and in England, but to the sub-committee it appears 
that the application to this subject of the fundamental rule 
of the Constitution, as expounded in the report referred to, 
affords the true solution of the question, and would furnish 
the nearest possible analogy between the practice proper to 
be pursued in each country. 
In the United Kingdom, while the British Parliament 
makes laws for the punishment of crimes committed by 
their inhabitants, the Sovereign exercises her prerogative of 
mercy towards such eriminals under the advice of her minister 
1 Above, pp. 158 seq.