1440 THE CHURCH IN THE DOMINIONS [PART VIL 
by a stipulation that the interpretation of the terms of 
association should be exclusively in the hands of a judicial 
body empowered to decide without question the limits of 
its own jurisdiction, and that the penalty of questioning 
the decisions of that tribunal should be expulsion from the 
association or a temporary loss of its benefits, but there was 
no such self-surrender or abrogation of rights in the contract 
in question, and the whole contract abounded in provisions 
for securing to members the preservation of rights and a fair 
trial of accusations. Moreover, the Cardross case was an 
authority in favour of the view which he took. Isaacs J. 
also rejected any universal claim for exclusive jurisdiction 
in the Church Courts. He said : 
But these tribunals, though conveniently enough styled 
Courts’, are not Courts in the legal sense. They have no 
jurisdiction properly so termed. The law invests them with 
no coercive power, with no authority to issue process, or to 
declare, determine, or enforce rights, and they are strictly 
dependent for such so-called jurisdiction as they possess 
upon the consent of the parties who are subject to it. In 
this respect the Act of 1900 makes no difference. That Act 
merely gives legal effect to an agreement for federal union, 
and bestows no changed character on the tribunals then 
already existing in the several states beyond subordinating 
them to the final decision and paramount authority of the 
Federal Assembly. All powers exercisable by the associa- 
tion, legislative, judicial, or administrative, if intended to 
bind its own members, must spring from their consent, and 
do not arise from the authority of the general law. 
He concluded from the decision in Long’s? case, and from 
the principle laid down there by Lord Kingsdown, that if 
a man made a voluntary submission he could not complain 
of the results of this submission. He thought that this 
was brought out by the authority of the Scottish judges in 
the Cardross ® case, but of course subject to the constitution 
which he accepted not containing some provision contrary 
to law, for such a provision could not be enforced. But 
that position was quite distinguishable from a provision 
* 8 C. L. R. 673, at pp. 704 seq. * 1 Moo. P. C. (N. 8.) 411, 
3 22 D., at pp. 314, 315.