CHAP. 14.—TYPICAL AND ODD FORMS 111

fixed by the boards. Where that was not the case it was tacitly
understood that the legal rates were part of the contracts, determin-Ing
 the remuneration of labor. The public authorities participate in
the establishment but not in the enforcement of the minimum wages.
Coal mining is not an unorganized trade, and the miners do not need
outside help for enforcing their wage contracts. They have obtained
 the minimum-wage regulations by strikes and maintain
them as part of their general position toward the employers—one
based on mutual force.
Particular evils have been remedied by this legislation, but the
great strikes in the English mines in 1921 and 1926 have shown
that partial application of minimum wage (the pieceork rates
which are outside the law are much more important) does not insure
industrial peace.
. The New Zealand and the Italian types of compulsory arbitration
 are both safeguarded by stipulations against strikes and are
more effective in that way than a law embodying mere fixation
of minimum wages would be. In Victoria such a law has created
an atmosphere of confidence in legal fixation of wages which has decreased
 the fighting spirit, but we must remember that the general
Prosperity of the Australian State has made it possible to increase
Wages in a way satisfying labor and preventing dissatisfaction.
British conditions were quite different. General trade depression
and lack of economic mana_ement of the decentralized British
mines have created a grave problem-—who, workers or employers,
shall bear the inevitable burden of decreasing the cost of production
 and give back to the mines the economic strength needed to
maintain British coal mining in competition with other countries?
To decide such question, lenient measures tending toward harmony
 have thus far proved insufficient; they could not guarantee
peace in a service of essential public necessity like the mines.3

Compulsory Arbitration in Public Utility Services of Rumania

The New Zealand experiment of compulsory arbitration, which in
that country practically implies legal fixation of wages, immediately
created intense interest in Europe. M. Millerand, at that time a
socialist leader and minister in France (later conservative President
of the Republic), has strongly advocated a similar law, without success.
 The postrevolutionary legislation in Germany (particularly
the ordinance for industrial conciliation of October 30, 1923 #) tended
in that direction but without leading to anything implying legal fixation
 of wages. Italy has taken more decisive steps; the background
there was essentially different, and the measure was part of a general
organization of industry. (See p. 104.)
The only European State where compulsory arbitration was applied
 and maintained as an isolated measure was Rumania. The
desire to prevent prejudice to general interests by differences be-“

 International Labor Office. Studies and reports, serles D (wages and hours of
work), No. 17: Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery. Geneva, 1927, pp. 81, 82.
® Wartime regulation of wages, having been discontinued, need nof be included in this
study devoted fo problems of present interest. The  fair-wages clause” in Government
contracts deserves to be mentioned, but also lies rather outside of our field.
¢ International Labor Office. Legislative series, 1928—Germany 6: Order respecting
conciliation. dated Oct. 30. 1923. Geneva.