THE RESULTS OF THE POLICY. 83

more than a certain preference without laying her
manufacturers open to British competition, and
this seems to be more than any Government dare
do, no matter what reciprocal advantage Britain
were to offer, On the other hand, the British preference
 thus limited is popular in Canada: to take
it away would be extremely unpopular, and it is
therefore highly improbable that any Government
would, without some reason that does not now exist,
care to incur the odium of being called disloyal.

GAIN TO THE EMPIRE.

Keeping the commercial side of the question
distinct from the Imperial side as it is in the
colonial mind, we next have to consider what
would be the effect of the transaction upon
Imperial relations ; and here we are at once
confronted with a difficulty. We have already
dealt with the manner in which the Canadian
regards the preference—his comparative indifference
 to the commercial advantages that it may
confer, and his determination not to be drawn
closer to Britain if it entails losing independence
or sharing Britain’s military and naval burdens.
It is the Imperial side of the scheme that he so
distrusts. And therefore the more successful the
scheme is from Mr. Chamberlain’s point of view the
more likely it is to prove distasteful to the
Canadian. In fact, Canada, if she enters at all,
enters without any great enthusiasm for one half
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