xvi
Introduction to the
though sometimes, by their curious ignorance of life
outside the Law Courts, and especially of “what everybody
knows,” they try us hard. But it is necessary to
state plainly, with regard to this part of the Osborne
Judgement, that to the present writers, as to many other
people, it seems an astounding aberration, amounting to a
grave miscarriage of justice. Again, let it be noted that
Lord James of Hereford, who knew what Parliament had
intended and what Trade Unions actually are, expressly
dissented from his colleagues on this point, saying that
the definition clause in the Act of 1 876 was never intended
to be “a clause of limitation or exhaustive definition ”’;
and arguing that it did not prevent a Trade Union from
having other purposes, or pursuing other methods, not in
themselves unlawful, even though these were not enumerated
in the definition clause and were not even incidental
to the purposes therein enumerated, But what is the
history of this definition clause? As it stands in the Act of
1876 it runs as follows :
“The term “trade union’ means any combination,
whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations
between workmen and masters, or between workmen
and workmen, or between masters and masters, or for imposing
restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade
or business, whether such combination would or would
not, if the principal Act had not been passed, have been
deemed to have been an unlawful combination by reason
of some one or more of its purposes being in restraint of
trade.”’
Now, to the lay mind, this extremely wide definition
seems plainly intended to bring into its net, and therefore
to admit to the advantages of the Act, a wide range of ex-