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be more reasonable to require the payment of his
taxes at or after harvest time than before, Again, as
to the manner of taking a tax, it will be more convenient
 if, for instance, there is a tax on spirits, to raise
this tax from the shop-keeper than to require the
payment of the tax from every person direct as he
buys his small purchase. A tax levied equally on
everybody, or a head tax, would lead to much expense
and much trouble to every one, but by putting a
small tax on salt, which every one uses, the head
tax is raised without dispute and with the greatest
convenience.

The fourth law implies that it is both unwise
and unjust to levy any tax which costs so much for
collecting it, that only a small balance is left after all
to the state. This would be the case if, for instance,
a tax was levied on the people according to the size
of the houses they occupied. It would be necessary
for this to keep up an immense number of measurers
and clerks to record the sizes of all the houses each
year, and the cost of all this would absorb probably
all or nearly all of the money that would be obtained
from the tax, while the people would thus be put to
great inconvenience and get no benefit from it.
The fifth law would require no comment in
Europe, and especially in England, where the people
are thoroughly aware of their rights, where the first
condition of existence of the government is that it
exists only at the will and for the benefit of the