4d

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11
This idea of the relativity of truth should not be understood
 as an approximation to an otherwise independent
concept of absolute truth, but as the essence of truth itself,
 as the way in which ideas become true. It does not
mean a knowledge of the truth from which more might
have been expected, but rather, on the contrary, the positive
 fulfilment and validity of its concept. The truth is not
valid in spite of its relativity, but because of its relativity.’
Not only does empirical knowledge result from specific
normative functions on the data of experience, but each
field of mental activity constructs a picture of the world
according to categories of its own. Art, religion, metaphysics,
 and science result from specific attitudes toward
the world, from specific ways of dealing with things. The
specific functional, formal activity of the mind is for Simmel
 the essence and significance of these fields. Their true
value lies, not in their content, not in the religious dogma
or in the metaphysical system, but in their function for
life. They have value as functions of life.
In the case of metaphysics, this differentiation between
the function and the content enables Simmel to give to the
metaphysical tendency, or to the process or mental attitude
 which results from it, a value and significance which
remain untouched by all the contradictions and untenable
points in its content. Philosophy as a thought form is unprejudiced
 against all contents and obtains a flexibility
and a possibility of extension which is unthinkable as long
as one searches for the essence of philosophy in the factual
content of its problems.
This differentiation therefore means more than a mere
differentiation; it means also an accentuation. It means
emphasizing the functional over the substantial aspect.
It means a change in conception from metaphysics as dog--

 Phil. des Geldes, pp. 78-82.