78
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE SELECT COMMITTEE
Rear Adm.
C.F.Hillyar,
C.B.
25 July
1871.
ports of arrival in the Persian Gulf and Arabia?
— The force was so small at my disposal that I
stationed the ships where they were most likely
to stop the passage of the dhows.
1140. Where were they stationed? — One
vessel was oif Socotra, and another one along the
coast of Arabia.
1141. The other three being near Zanzibar?
— Two ivere in dock at Bombay, so that I had
only three disposable vessels during the principal
time of the slave trade, which is during March,
April, and May.
1142. Have you any recollection of how many
captures of dhows you effected?—It might easily
be seen by my letters in the Blue Book of 1867 ;
speaking from recollection, I should say we
captured about 1,200 slaves in the twelvemonth.
114.3. Had you very much difficulty in discriminating
between dhows that were legally
permitted to convey slaves for the home use of
Zanzibar and its dependencies, and those which
were bound to Arabia, and which you were entitled
to capture ?—The difficulty of course arising
from our not being entitled to capture vessels
employed on the coast within the limits within
which the slave trade was allowed to be carried
on. Captain Bedingfield wrote a very strong
letter on the subject, and so did the senior officer
at Zanzibar.
1144. During the part of the year when that
trade was allowed it became extremely difficult
for naval officers to suppress the illegal trade ?—
Yes.
1145. Those limits extended from Kilwa to
Damoo ?—Yes.
1146. During your command within those
waters, dhows may have nominally cleared at the
custom house of Zanzibar for those ports, which
were really intending to proceed on a longer
voyage ? —No, I do not think they could have
proceeded on a longer voyage without laying in
a stock of water or slave fittings on a more extensive
scale.
1147. They would touch at the Port of Lamoo
as the previous witness has said, and they would
then proceed on?—Yes; they could not have
proceeded on their voyage without touching at
Lamoo or some other port.
1148. Vessels going to Lamoo and intending
apparently, according to the custom-house
clearance, to land the slaves there, intended
really to lay in provisions at Lamoo and evade
your squadron and proceed on a longer voyage ?
—Their great object was to evade the squadron;
they are up to every dodge you can think of.
1149. Do you think that many vessels did
evade the squadron in that way ?—I should say
for every one captured seven or eight escaped ;
I should say more, perhaps.
1150. I suppose, with your experience of the
West Coast of Africa, you feel that the export
of slaves there could hardly have been stopped
by our squadron if it had not been for the treaties
with Brazil and the operations on the coast of
Cuba at the same time ?—Certainly not without
the treaty with the Brazils.
1151. Therefore, would it not seem to you
that to enter into treaties with Persia and with
Muscat would be the course to pursue to stop the
slave trade, rather than the imperfect operations
now carried on on the coast of Zanzibar?—No, I
think the treaties which have been generally
entered into have had very little effect in stopping
the slave trade. I think the slave trade with
the Brazils has been mainly stopped by the vok^
OÍ the country, the people disapproving of th^
importation of slaves ; of course the difficultly"
attending tlie passage of the slaves and the ship
ping the slaves on the West Coast had soiR^'
thing to do with it. The death blow to the slaV^’
trade on the West Coast of Africa was the cap
ture and retention of Lagos. !
1152. Looking to that, do you think that th^j
occupation of Zanzibar, or some other arrangé] !
ment that would give us the control there, woul*^^!
be the proper mode to stop the slave trade on th^|
East Coast ?—I have no doubt that the occupé'
tion of Zanzibar, or the cession of Zanzibar
the British Government, would very material!.'
tend to suppress the slave trade on the Ea=‘
Coast. I think it is the focus of the slave trat!*-1
on the East Coast much the same as Lagos aVíi' j
on the West Coast.
1153. You do not anticipate at present th^^ :
any operations on our part will stop the slaV^ ;
trade so long as it is the interest of the Sultai’ :
of Zanzibar to continue it ?—As long as th*^ |
Sultan of Zanzibar derives his main revenii^ 1
from the slave trade, I think he will encourag*- ’
it, either openly or under the rose.
1154. With reference to the number of ship
you would think it necessary to employ, if yo'*
were sent there for the speeial purpose of stop'
ping the slave trade on the coast of Arabia aO'^
on the East Coast of Africa, will you indicate h]
the Committee what number of ships you wouk‘
think necessary for that purpose, and the class 0!
ship ?—I should say a dozen ships of the cla?“'
that are at present on the South East Coas^ j
which have been highly reported on as efficiei^^
vessels ; the same description of vessels that at' j
at present employed. i
1155. You think 12 would be enough ?—Ye^' |
1156. Both for the coast of Africa and th^i
coast of Arabia ?—Yes, those vessels should j
supplied with good boats, and should be special!.' '
fitted out for the suppression of the slave trade-1157.
Chairman.] With steam launches?-^
Steam launches are a most valuable auxiliary- :
1158. Sir J. Hay.^ Have you any suggestion*
to make to the Committee with reference to oP
future policy in carrying out the desire of tlb'
country to suppress the slave trade there ?--^|
have every reason to believe from what I ha''’
heard, since I gave up the command of tM
squadron in the East Indies, that the slave trad'’
has been on the decrease, and that it is not ne^j
so active at Zanzibar as it was in 1867, and 186^
when certainly the exportation of slaves coul^
not have been less than 20,000 annually.
1159. Do you attribute that decrease to legi^^'
mate commerce, or to the operations of tb^
squadron ?—I should say to both, the squadr'^^'
has been very active ; there has been a mo'^
efficient force employed, and the vessels ha''’
been of a superior description.
1160. Chairman.'] You spoke as if the receipt'
from slaves were the main revenue of the Sultai'"
we have had evidence to show that it is not abo''
a sixth part of his whole revenue ?—I am spea^
ing of what it was, four years makes a gi'^f
difference ; there has been a rapid increase
trade, generally, in Zanzibar ; I was alluding
my impression of what was the state of thio0'
four or five years ago, when I understood it
his principal source of revenue.
1161. Sir R. Anstruther.] Evidence was gi''^^|
by the last witness as to the misconduct of
)y
