158
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE
Apjiendix,
* Appendix
graph 4.
i Appendix
graph 5.
§ Appendix ]
to Query 14.
I; Appendix B;
to Query 16.
No. 8. ment of their diiferences in that respect to the Eight honourable the Governor General is
~ a plain avowal of the existence of their rival claims, and eifectually invalidates any such
recognition unless eventually found to be in accordance with the final decision of the
elected arbitrator.
23. The argument next adduced by Syud Majeed, on the ground of his bavin«- been
acknowledged as sovereign by his elder brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, beinr^based
, paia- Qjj one-sided evidence, is inadmissible. His Highness alleges* that Mahomed biii^Salem,
the envoy of Syud Thoweynee, who was fully authorised to come to an understandino* with
him on all public as well as private matters connected with the death of their late father,
did fully recognise that Zanzibar and its African dependencies belonged of right to him ;
on the other hand, Syud Thoweynee disavows that any such concession was ever authorised
or made by or for him, and unhappily no documentary evidence is forthcoming to verify
the assertion oí either party. For a similar reason, no satisfactory conclusion can be
drawn from the contradictory statements regarding the yearly grant of forty thousand
crowns which Syud Majeed agreed to pay to Syud Thoweynee, the latter aifirmino- that his
agent accepted it in his behalf as tribute ; whereas Syud Majeed insists that it was criven
and accepted as ^friendly gift, and on the express condition that he should be reco^ised
by his brother Thoweynee as the supreme ruler of Zanzibar and its dependencies. The only
two documents produced by Syud Majeed in sujjport of his assertions have already been
described in paragraph 11. In the letter written by Mahomed bin Salem from Muscat to
the Customs master at Zanzibar, he does, indeed, speak of the grant made by Majeed to
Thoweynee as a “masaadeh ”—that is, an aid or subsidy ;f but, on the one hand, it is by
no means apparent that Syud Thoweynee sanctioned such a definition of the money; and,
on the other, it is just the style which Mahomed bin Salem might bo expected to adopt in
writing to Zanzibar, supposing, what I believe to be now generally believed, that the said
agent, in his transactions between the two brothers, had managed to deceive both parties
to his own advantage. The other document—namely, Syud Majeed’s order to the customs
mastei at Zanzibai to pay to his brother a “ subsidy ” of forty thousand crowns iier annum
—may go a certain way to indicate what His Highness’s own views were in bestowing the
grant ; but it fails to prove in any degree that Syud Thoweynee had accepted it in*^that
light. His Highness, in his written statement, also alludes to a declaration which
Mahomed bin Salem had drawn up, previous to quitting Zanzibar, for presentation to
Syud Thoweynee on his return to Muscat. According to him it was to the foilov/in«-
effect:—‘‘I, Mahomed bin Salem, ask of Majeed bin Saeed an annual subsidy of forty
j, para- thousand crowns in behalf of his brother Thoweynee bin Saeed.”f No such paper is forth
coming ; and the circumstances under which it is stated to have been prepared are so im
probable as to throw considerable doubt on His Highness’s veracity.
24. Summing up the foregoing considerations, I am led to conclude that Syud Majeed’s
claims to the independent sovereignty of Zanzibar, as based on his alleged recognition by
Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, through the medium of his agent and plenipotentiary, Mahomed
bin Salem, must be pronounced untenable.
25. I shall now proceed to discuss the last argument urged in behalf of Syud Maieed’s
claims, namely, his election as their sovereign by the chiefs of Zanzibar and its Afriean
depenÿncies. His Highness’s own statement to that effect, already quoted in pararrranh
10, IS fully confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Eigby, who believes that, if tlm suf
frages of the principal chiefs were taken, the majority would undoubtedly elect Syud
i, reply Majeed in preference to Syud Thoweynee.§ And again, referring to the meditated attack
from Muscat in 1859, the same officer writes; W hen the invasion of the Zanzibar
dominions by Syud Thoweynee was expected, the inhabitants of the Sowahili rose en masse
to support Syud Majeed. Many tribes under their own chiefs came over to Zanzibar;
every accessible point on the coast was occupied ; and when some of the dhows which had
Syud Thoweynee’s troops on board endeavoured to procure wood and water, they were
ariven from every point at which they attempted to land, and at length were oblio-ed, in
consequence, to surrender to Syud Majeed’s ships-of-war. At Zanzibar the Sowahili popu
lation and the natives of the Comoro Isles -were all in arms to support Syud Majeed, and I
heard many of them state, as a reason for doing so, that the Muscat Arabs come here to
1 V children and carry them away as slaves. The northern Arabs are feared and
. I’epiy hated, at Zanzibar. ||
Without attempting to analyse the causes which led to this general preference of
Syud Majeed to Syud Thowyenee, there is no good reason to doubt the fact of its existence.
That being the case, the question naturally arises whether such recognition of his claims
validly entitles Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.
27. I have already pointed out (paragraph 14) that the supreme power over Oman was
conferred by election, and (paragraph 3) that, in virtue of that election, his late Hio-hness
Syud Saeed acquired the right of sovereignty over the African dependencies of the parent
state. It does not appear, however (in fact, it is highly improbable), that the people of
those dependencies enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the election of the sovereign. Up
to
t The distinction between the import of the Arabic terms which I have throughout expressed by the
EDghshwoTd8"sub8idy"and "tribute" is most explicit. Theformerdenotesaeiftaccol-dedsoleEby
the will of the giver ; the latter implies obligation, and a proof of subjection to superior authority. ^ ^
