164 
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE 
Appendix, No. 8. submit the following results as the most equitable terms for settling the existing dispute 
between the rival parties ;— 
Terms of the 
Arhitration, 
1st. That Syud Majeed should be confirmed in the independent sovereignty over 
Zanzibar and its African territories. 
2nd. That as regards the succession to that sovereignty, neither the ruler of 
Muscat, nor the tribes of Oman, shall have any right whatever to interfere ; but the 
Sovereign of Zanzibar, or the sovereign in conjunction with the people, shall be left 
absolutely free to make whatever arrangements they may deem expedient for 
appointing future successors to Syud Majeed. 
3rd. That in consideration of these concessions, Syud Majeed shall be bound to 
remit to Syud Thoweynee the stipulated yearly subsidy of 40,000 crowns ; and 
further, to liquidate all the arrears due on that account since the payment was 
suspended. 
4th. That this subsidy of 40,000 crowns per annum shall be a primary and per 
manent charge on the revenues of the Zanzibar state, payable by the Sovereign of 
that state to the ruling Sovereign of Muscat and Oman. 
47. The liberty accorded me by the Honourable the Governor in Council, of recom 
mending a fair adjustment of the differences existing between their Highnesses Syud 
Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, has warranted mein submitting these terms as, in my opinion, 
the best which can be proposed to that end. I do not feel authorised to exceed the limits 
of my commission by advising any precautionary measures for the due observance of those 
terms by the rival parties ; nevertheless, as it does not appear that the Right Honourable 
the Governor General has undertaken to guarantee that his final arbitration shall be 
carried out, and as it is more than probable that pretexts will be constantly devised on 
both sides to evade the obligations imposed by his Lordship’s decision, pretexts which, by 
re-opening the existing dispute, will entail the most disastrous consequences to the welfare 
of the two states, I venture with much diffidence to suggest whether the following subsi 
diary terms might not be insisted on as a safeguard against such evasions :— 
5th. That no cause whatever, other than an open attempt on the part of Syud 
Thoweynee or his successors to infringe upon the independence of the Zanzibar 
sovereignty, shall be held to justify Syud Majeed or his successors in withholding the 
stipulated subsidy. 
6th. That in the event of any such attempt being made by the ruler of Muscat, 
or, on the other hand, in the event of the Sovereign of the Zanzibar state failing, 
under any plea whatever, to pay the aforesaid subsidy, the aggrieved party shall 
submit the case to the Viceroy and Governor General of India before proceeding to 
settle the dispute by an appeal to arms. 
* Appendix K, 
Enclosure. 
t Appendix B, reply 
to (¿ucry 40. 
t Appendix L, para 
graph (5. 
§ Appendix B, reply 
to Query 17. 
I Appendix K, 
Enclosure. 
Appendix K. 
** Appendix'B, rC' 
ply to Query 39. 
48. I have deemed it desirable to insist on the payment of the subsidy agreed on 
between the two parties, because various excuses are urged by Syud Majeed to evade that 
obligation.* The most reasonable of these is the actual condition of his Highness’ 
finances. On this subject Colonel Rigby writes : The difficulty arises from the embar 
rassed state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syud Majeed is entirely dependent on the will of 
his customs master for supplies of money, and were he now to bind himself to the payment 
of an annual sum, and the customs master subsequently refused to advance the amount, 
Syud Majeed might be compelled to break bis engagement without any fault of his own.’ 
As an offset, however, against the difficulty. Colonel Rigby subjoins—“ But if his High 
ness could be persuaded to establish a small force of disciplined troops, with a few light 
guns, in place of the useless rabble now in his pay, and would also get rid of most of the 
large ships which he now has, and which are of no use whatever, and in place of them 
keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, it would be a great direct saving to 
him ; and knowing that he had troops he could rely on, he would feel more independent 
of the Arabs from the north, and of the chiefs of tribes, amongst whom he squanders so 
much money .”t Syud Majeed himself estimates the amount which he pays yearly in 
gratuities to the northern Arabs at 15,000 crowns and Colonel Rigby gives a list of 
several of the principal chiefs of Zanzibar who are subsidised by Syud Majeed, and whose 
afvo-regate incomes from his treasury exceed 10,000 crowns per annum.§ The saving of 
these sums alone (and there would certainly be no reason for their being continued when 
once the sovereignty of Zanzibar was secured to Syud Majeed) would suffice to cover more 
than one-half of the Muscat subsidy ; and if, in addition thereto, his Highness would 
abstain from other useless expenditure, there can be no doubt that he would be able to 
meet the obligation with comparative ease. As regards his debts to the customs master, 
amounting to 327,000 crowns,|| and those to his orphan brothers, whose share of their 
father’s iiffieritance he has borrowed to the extent of seven lacs of crowns,^ Colonel Rigby, 
after reviewing Syud Majeed’s financial position, comes to the conclusion that, with 
prudence and care, his existing liabilities might soon be paid off.”** 
49. But the finances of Syud Thoweynee are comparatively as much embarrassed as those 
of Syud Majeed, and the payment annually of 40,000 crowns by the latter, considering the 
capabilities of the Zanzibar territories, will still leave him in better circumstances than 
the