164
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE
Appendix, No. 8. submit the following results as the most equitable terms for settling the existing dispute
between the rival parties ;—
Terms of the
Arhitration,
1st. That Syud Majeed should be confirmed in the independent sovereignty over
Zanzibar and its African territories.
2nd. That as regards the succession to that sovereignty, neither the ruler of
Muscat, nor the tribes of Oman, shall have any right whatever to interfere ; but the
Sovereign of Zanzibar, or the sovereign in conjunction with the people, shall be left
absolutely free to make whatever arrangements they may deem expedient for
appointing future successors to Syud Majeed.
3rd. That in consideration of these concessions, Syud Majeed shall be bound to
remit to Syud Thoweynee the stipulated yearly subsidy of 40,000 crowns ; and
further, to liquidate all the arrears due on that account since the payment was
suspended.
4th. That this subsidy of 40,000 crowns per annum shall be a primary and permanent
charge on the revenues of the Zanzibar state, payable by the Sovereign of
that state to the ruling Sovereign of Muscat and Oman.
47. The liberty accorded me by the Honourable the Governor in Council, of recommending
a fair adjustment of the differences existing between their Highnesses Syud
Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, has warranted mein submitting these terms as, in my opinion,
the best which can be proposed to that end. I do not feel authorised to exceed the limits
of my commission by advising any precautionary measures for the due observance of those
terms by the rival parties ; nevertheless, as it does not appear that the Right Honourable
the Governor General has undertaken to guarantee that his final arbitration shall be
carried out, and as it is more than probable that pretexts will be constantly devised on
both sides to evade the obligations imposed by his Lordship’s decision, pretexts which, by
re-opening the existing dispute, will entail the most disastrous consequences to the welfare
of the two states, I venture with much diffidence to suggest whether the following subsidiary
terms might not be insisted on as a safeguard against such evasions :—
5th. That no cause whatever, other than an open attempt on the part of Syud
Thoweynee or his successors to infringe upon the independence of the Zanzibar
sovereignty, shall be held to justify Syud Majeed or his successors in withholding the
stipulated subsidy.
6th. That in the event of any such attempt being made by the ruler of Muscat,
or, on the other hand, in the event of the Sovereign of the Zanzibar state failing,
under any plea whatever, to pay the aforesaid subsidy, the aggrieved party shall
submit the case to the Viceroy and Governor General of India before proceeding to
settle the dispute by an appeal to arms.
* Appendix K,
Enclosure.
t Appendix B, reply
to (¿ucry 40.
t Appendix L, paragraph
(5.
§ Appendix B, reply
to Query 17.
I Appendix K,
Enclosure.
Appendix K.
** Appendix'B, rC'
ply to Query 39.
48. I have deemed it desirable to insist on the payment of the subsidy agreed on
between the two parties, because various excuses are urged by Syud Majeed to evade that
obligation.* The most reasonable of these is the actual condition of his Highness’
finances. On this subject Colonel Rigby writes : The difficulty arises from the embarrassed
state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syud Majeed is entirely dependent on the will of
his customs master for supplies of money, and were he now to bind himself to the payment
of an annual sum, and the customs master subsequently refused to advance the amount,
Syud Majeed might be compelled to break bis engagement without any fault of his own.’
As an offset, however, against the difficulty. Colonel Rigby subjoins—“ But if his Highness
could be persuaded to establish a small force of disciplined troops, with a few light
guns, in place of the useless rabble now in his pay, and would also get rid of most of the
large ships which he now has, and which are of no use whatever, and in place of them
keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, it would be a great direct saving to
him ; and knowing that he had troops he could rely on, he would feel more independent
of the Arabs from the north, and of the chiefs of tribes, amongst whom he squanders so
much money .”t Syud Majeed himself estimates the amount which he pays yearly in
gratuities to the northern Arabs at 15,000 crowns and Colonel Rigby gives a list of
several of the principal chiefs of Zanzibar who are subsidised by Syud Majeed, and whose
afvo-regate incomes from his treasury exceed 10,000 crowns per annum.§ The saving of
these sums alone (and there would certainly be no reason for their being continued when
once the sovereignty of Zanzibar was secured to Syud Majeed) would suffice to cover more
than one-half of the Muscat subsidy ; and if, in addition thereto, his Highness would
abstain from other useless expenditure, there can be no doubt that he would be able to
meet the obligation with comparative ease. As regards his debts to the customs master,
amounting to 327,000 crowns,|| and those to his orphan brothers, whose share of their
father’s iiffieritance he has borrowed to the extent of seven lacs of crowns,^ Colonel Rigby,
after reviewing Syud Majeed’s financial position, comes to the conclusion that, with
prudence and care, his existing liabilities might soon be paid off.”**
49. But the finances of Syud Thoweynee are comparatively as much embarrassed as those
of Syud Majeed, and the payment annually of 40,000 crowns by the latter, considering the
capabilities of the Zanzibar territories, will still leave him in better circumstances than
the
