Appendix, No. 8. 
No. 19, of 1859. 
No. 46, of 1859. 
No. 19, of 1859. 
No. 46, of 1859. 
178 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM SELECT COMMITTEE 
SO many years in consequence of the late Imam being a non-resident, the Zanzibar State 
were to gradually lose its power over the territories of the mainland, the petty sultans and 
chiefs would become independent; the treaties for the suppression of the slave-trade would 
be disregarded ; foreign settlements would be established ; and all hope of progress would 
be destroyed. 
Q. 37.—Will you further point out the disadvantages of the two states being conjoined 
as heretofore under one paramount sovereign ? 
A. This question is answered by the first part of my answer to the last. 
Q. 38.—In the event of the Governor General’s arbitration awarding absolute indepen 
dence to the Zanzibar State under the sovereignty of Syud Majeed, how would you prO|)ose 
to provide for the future succession ? By election of the people and tribes ; by the c airns 
of primogeniture in the Syud fimily ; or by the will of the sovereign? 
A.—I think it will be extremely advantageous to the future prosperity of the Zanzibar 
State, if some arrangements as to ihe future succession can be made in the event of Syud 
Majeed being declared its independent chief; for this prince has no male issue, and I think 
it not likely that he will have any. I think that it might be left to the choice of all the 
family of the late Imam, or Syud Majeed mi^ht nominate one of his brothers to succeed 
him, subject to the ratification of the principal chiefs at Zanzibar. If the members of the 
Syud’s family could be induced to always, in future, admit the claims of primogeniture, I 
think it would be a very great advantage. At present the subject is always in doubt, and 
leads to quarrels and assassinations in the family. 
Q. 39.—Should the arbitration decree the union of the two states under the suzerainty of 
Syud Thoweynee, as they were foimerly conjoined und r that of the .ate Syud Saeed, what 
arrangements would you deem most desirable for 'he governorship of Zanzibar and its 
dependencies ? 
A. That the Government slnmld be administered as at present by Syud Majeed, and that 
he should not be subject to any interference on the part of his sovereign so long as he con 
tinued to pay the Muscat Treasury whatever sum might be agreed upon. At present the 
finances of the Zanzibar State are very much embarrassed, but with ¡.rudence and care the 
existing liabilities might soon be paid off. Twenty-ñve years ago the late Imam did not 
receive more than 50,000 crowns of annual revenue from his African possessions. In 1847 
it had increased to 145,000 crowns, and at present the revenue amounts to 208,000 crowns. 
Q- 40.—Should the balance of argument on the score of general expediency, involving 
the future prosperity of the Zanzibar State, he in favour of Syud Majeed, and that of right 
derived from pre-existing custom, be on the side of Syud Thowevnee, would it not be prac 
ticable and desirable to effect a comriromise on the basis of the * stipulated sum of 40,000 
crowns being paid by Syud Majeed to Syud Thoweynee as tribute, the former being allowed 
to retain the governorship of Zanzibar and its dependencies for life, and the future succes 
sion being left to be decided as heretofore ? 
A.— In this case I think it would be highly desirable to effect a compromise, but the 
difficulty arises from the embarrassed state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syud Majeed is en 
tirely di pendent on the will of his Customs Master for supplies of money, and were he now 
to bind himself to the payment of an annual sum, and the Customs Master subsequently 
refused to advance the amount, Syud Majeed might be compelled to break his engao-ement 
without any fault of bis own. But if his Highness could be prevailed on to establish a 
small force of disciplined troops with a few light guns, in place of the useless rabble now in 
his pay, and would also get rid of most of the large ships which he now has, and which are 
of no use whatever, and in place of them keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, 
it would be a great direct saving to him ; and knowing that he had troops he con id rely on, 
he would feel more independent of the Arabs from the north and of the chiefs of tribes 
amongst whom he now squanders so much money. With regard to the succession being 
h ft to be decided as heretofore, I think that it would be a v, ly great advantage, and probably 
avert lunch future evil, if some arrangement regarding it could be come to at the time the 
question of present sovereignty is settled. 
SOHAR. 
Query 41. Colonel Hamerton, in his letter to Lord Clarendon, dated 7th November 
1854, does not allude to any arrangement whereby the late Syud Saeed constituted his son 
Torkee ruler of Sobar, independent of Muscat. No such arrangement is to be found either 
in Colonel Hamerton’s letter, 31st July 1844, to Lord Aberdeen, or in the letter of his late 
Highness Syud Saeed to his Lordship, dated 23rd July 1844. On the other hand you 
state that “ Syud Toorkee was put in possession of Schar by his father,” and from the con 
tents it is to be inferred tluif Sobar was to be as independent of Muscat as Zanzibar. And 
in another place you adduce Syud Hilal’s testimony to the same efleet. Will you be (rood 
enough to furnish me with any other arguments in favour of the alleo-( d independency of 
Sobar under Syud Torkee ? o i J 
Answer.—'No document whatever exists in the records of the Consulate on this subject. 
From what I had always been told by Arabs at Zanzibar, and also from what Syud HilaL 
said, I was under the impression that Syud Torkee had been placed in possession of Sobar 
by his father as an independent State, in the same manner as it had formerly been granted 
by