96 THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED
use, throughout, the agency of Banks, which are to find
investment for their savings. Suppose the Banks, not
realising the mode of this new saving, have invested the
first year’s savings in superfluous cotton mills. These
cotton mills or others in the next year cannot continue
to work without advances from Banks, since they are
unable to effect profitable sales. Soon after the beginning
of the second year the Banks will refuse to make further
advances for over-production : markets being congested and
prices falling, the demand for bank accommodation will grow,
but banks will not be justified in making advances. Now
the weaker mills must stop work, general short time follows,
and the result is an unemployment of labour and forms
of capital. This is the first effect of the attempt to over-save
upon employment. We have now for the first time a reduction
of the aggregate of production. The result of reduced
employment (under-production) will be a reduction of real
incomes. This will tend to proceed until the reduced reward
of saving (real interest)* gradually restores the right proportion
of saving to spending—a very slow and wasteful cure.
It thus appears that so long as “ saving” can be vested in
new forms of capital, whether these are socially useful or not,
no net reduction of employment is caused, the portion of
income which is “saved” employs as much labouras, though
not more than, that which is “spent,” but when the machinery
of production is so glutted that attempted saving takes shape
in the massing of “loanable capital” unable to find an investment,
the net production and the net employment of labour in
the community is smaller than it would have been had saving
* Observe that an over-supply of capital does not bring down the “rate
of interest,” though it reduces the real reward of saving. The effect of
putting up unnecessary mills is to lower the capital value of each mill.
The rate of interest on this reduced valuation may be the same as before
(Cf. Hadley, p. 278).