lo8  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  UNEMPLOYED

tion  of  the  lowest-paid  class  of  labour  in  the  community.
It  can,  I  think,  easily  be  seen  that  the  “  real  wages  ”
of  this  class  cannot  be  reduced  by  a  tax  upon  the  money
wage,  even  in  the  form  of  a  rise  of  prices:  if  the  prices
of  articles  consumed  by  the  “  marginal  ”  labourer  are
raised,  his  wages  must  rise  to  meet  them.  Similarly  an
attempt  to  tax  other  classes  of  labour  with  a  strongly
fixed  standard  of  comfort  will  be  resisted.  In  other
words  the  higher  prices  will  not  ultimately  injure  the
standard  of  comfort  of  the  lower  strata  of  workers  but
will  tend  to  fall,  like  a  tax,  upon  the  unearned  incomes
which  can  afford  to  pay  the  higher  prices.  Skilled  workmen
with  high  wages  or  whose  standards  of  comfort  were  not
strongly  fixed  might  suffer  somewhat  from  the  rise  of
prices,  but  most  of  the  increased  cost  would  ultimately
settle  upon  “  surplus  "  income.
§  io.  Where  International  Competition  Keeps
down  Profits  and  Prices.
The  third  possibility  lies  in  the  trades  where  international ­
  competition  presses  keenly  and  where  reduced
hours  would  not  be  compensated  by  increased  productivity
of  labour  per  hour.  Here  the  normal  result  of  pressing
a  shorter  working-day  on  any  other  than  an  international
basis  would  be  to  disable  all  weaker  competitors  from
continuing  in  business,  with  the  effect  of  reducing  the
total  output  of  the  trade  and  the  total  volume  of  employment. ­
  Some  trades  are  certainly  in  such  a  case  that
reduced  hours  would  imply  an  increased  wages-bill  which
could  neither  be  paid  out  of  profits  nor  by  raising  prices  :
here  the  compulsory  application  of  shorter  hours  (unless
in  pursuance  of  international  policy)  would  reduce  both