118 
142^-143), whilst he might have had to pay 
90 for Cordoba Second Preference (quoted 
88-90), what would his position have been in 
March, 1907 ? Why, he would then have 
found that the Buenos Ayres & Pacific Stock 
had in the meantime not only dropped in 
value, but had also lost its free market, and he 
would have to accept 119 for, or in other 
words he would have lost £24 on, every £100 
of stock which he held. Whilst Cordoba 
Central Second Preference, which had also 
receded in the meantime, and still remained 
a wide-priced stock, were yet saleable at 86 
(quotation 86-88) representing a loss of £4 
only on every £100 of stock held. 
It is true that in the purchase of the 
Buenos Ayres & Pacific Stock only 10s. more 
than the lowest price quoted at the time was 
paid, while the market turn in the Cordoba 
case amounted to £2, yet not all this disadvan 
tage in dealing was repeated at the time of sale. 
Thus nominally about £2 was saved on the 
Buenos Ayres & Pacific transaction. But into 
what utter insignificance these forty shillings 
sink when it is considered that the cheaply 
completed transaction produced an ultimate 
loss of £24 against a loss of £4 only on 
the same quantity of the less negotiable 
security.