206 
APPENDIX OF CASES. 
their members from stamp duty in respect of documents 
immediately connected with the society. 
The conclusion was drawn in Walker v. Giles from the 
peculiar words of the earlier Act, that its operation was 
extended to mortgages made to the society, but my impres 
sion is that it was never intended that strangers borrowing 
money of such societies should be put in a different position 
from other persons. Now I agree that if transfers of mort 
gages are exempted, then equally original mortgages are 
exempted, where according to the universal course of busi 
ness the duty is paid not by the lender but by the borrower. 
But this would be to secure a benefit not to the society but 
to those who borrow of it. Now, if the words in this section 
are read in their ordinary meaning, there is no word applic 
able to this case; but moreover I think that the words “nor 
other security” are omitted for the very purpose of prevent 
ing this question arising. The Court of Common Pleas had 
thought that mortgages were within the terms of the pre 
vious Act, and it is clear that the words they relied on were 
those very words which are now left out. Further, my im 
pression is that the word “ bond,” which occurs in both the 
earlier and present section, refers not to a loan or invest 
ment of the society’s funds in or upon bonds, such as the 
harbour bonds of the Mersey Docks, but to bonds given 
whether with or without security by clerks, agents to receive 
money, and others as security for their duly accounting or 
otherwise discharging the functions of their office. That I 
think also was the nature of the security mentioned in the 
earlier Act, but a more extensive meaning having been 
attributed to it, the word was afterwards omitted. Then 
the question comes to this, whether the words in the latter 
part of the section, read in conjunction with the instru 
ments previously enumerated, where bonds are mentioned,, 
but securities are omitted, are not to be confined to instru 
ments ejusdem cjeneris. I concur in thinking that they are, 
and that this mortgage was not within the meaning of the 
section. 
PictOTT, B.—I am of the same opinion. If this question 
had arisen under the old Act I should have agreed with 
the Court of Common Pleas in Walker v. Giles, that giving 
their fair meaning to the words, they were large enough to. 
have embraced this mortgage, but I can find no words in 
the late Act showing an intention to create so wide an 
exemption, the very words relied on in that case being 
omitted. The only ground of argument in favour of the 
exemption is that the words “ any other document what-