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APPENDIX  OF  CASES.

their  members  from  stamp  duty  in  respect  of  documents
immediately  connected  with  the  society.
The  conclusion  was  drawn  in  Walker  v.  Giles  from  the
peculiar  words  of  the  earlier  Act,  that  its  operation  was
extended  to  mortgages  made  to  the  society,  but  my  impression ­
  is  that  it  was  never  intended  that  strangers  borrowing
money  of  such  societies  should  be  put  in  a  different  position
from  other  persons.  Now  I  agree  that  if  transfers  of  mortgages ­
  are  exempted,  then  equally  original  mortgages  are
exempted,  where  according  to  the  universal  course  of  business ­
  the  duty  is  paid  not  by  the  lender  but  by  the  borrower.
But  this  would  be  to  secure  a  benefit  not  to  the  society  but
to  those  who  borrow  of  it.  Now,  if  the  words  in  this  section
are  read  in  their  ordinary  meaning,  there  is  no  word  applicable ­
  to  this  case;  but  moreover  I  think  that  the  words  “nor
other  security”  are  omitted  for  the  very  purpose  of  preventing ­
  this  question  arising.  The  Court  of  Common  Pleas  had
thought  that  mortgages  were  within  the  terms  of  the  previous ­
  Act,  and  it  is  clear  that  the  words  they  relied  on  were
those  very  words  which  are  now  left  out.  Further,  my  impression ­
  is  that  the  word  “  bond,”  which  occurs  in  both  the
earlier  and  present  section,  refers  not  to  a  loan  or  investment ­
  of  the  society’s  funds  in  or  upon  bonds,  such  as  the
harbour  bonds  of  the  Mersey  Docks,  but  to  bonds  given
whether  with  or  without  security  by  clerks,  agents  to  receive
money,  and  others  as  security  for  their  duly  accounting  or
otherwise  discharging  the  functions  of  their  office.  That  I
think  also  was  the  nature  of  the  security  mentioned  in  the
earlier  Act,  but  a  more  extensive  meaning  having  been
attributed  to  it,  the  word  was  afterwards  omitted.  Then
the  question  comes  to  this,  whether  the  words  in  the  latter
part  of  the  section,  read  in  conjunction  with  the  instruments ­
  previously  enumerated,  where  bonds  are  mentioned,,
but  securities  are  omitted,  are  not  to  be  confined  to  instruments ­
  ejusdem  cjeneris.  I  concur  in  thinking  that  they  are,
and  that  this  mortgage  was  not  within  the  meaning  of  the
section.
PictOTT,  B.—I  am  of  the  same  opinion.  If  this  question
had  arisen  under  the  old  Act  I  should  have  agreed  with
the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  in  Walker  v.  Giles,  that  giving
their  fair  meaning  to  the  words,  they  were  large  enough  to.
have  embraced  this  mortgage,  but  I  can  find  no  words  in
the  late  Act  showing  an  intention  to  create  so  wide  an
exemption,  the  very  words  relied  on  in  that  case  being
omitted.  The  only  ground  of  argument  in  favour  of  the
exemption  is  that  the  words  “  any  other  document  what-