220

APPENDIX  OF  CASES.

These  decisions  have  been  followed  in  the  recent  cases  of
Callaghan  v.  Dolioin,  L.  B.  4  0.  P.  288,  and  Thompson  v.
Planet  Building  Society,  L.  R.  15  Eq.  333.
The  words  “  every  dispute  ”  must  he  read  as  referring
only  to  disputes  between  the  society  and  the  members  as
members,  and  not  in  any  other  capacity  they  may  be  placed
in,  by  having  the  funds  of  the  society  advanced  to  them
by  way  of  mortgage,  or  on  loan  on  the  security  of  their
policies.  In  Morrison  v.  Glover,  19  L.  J.  (Excli.)  20,  the
defendant,  a  member  of  a  building  society,  having  mortgaged ­
  some  leasehold  premises  to  the  society,  and  thereby
covenanted  to  observe  the  rules,  and  also  to  pay  certain
rents  due  to  the  superior  landlord,  was  sued  for  breaches  of
both  these  covenants;  but  contended  by  his  plea  that  the
cause  of  action  ought  to  have  been  referred  to  arbitration
pursuant  to  the  rules.  The  court,  in  delivering  judgment,
said  :—“  The  only  point  that  remained  for  our  consideration
was,  whether  this  was  a  matter  in  dispute  between  the
society  and  one  of  its  members,  according  to  the  true
meaning  of  the  rules  established  by  the  society,  so  as  to  be
the  subject-matter  of  arbitration,  or  whether  it  might  be
made  the  subject  of  an  action.  It  was  contended  on  the
part  of  the  defendant,  that  whatever  question  arose  between
the  society  and  its  members  must  be  referred  to  arbitration.
They  way  in  which  it  became  material  was  this  :  Some  of
the  grounds  of  the  action  were  undoubtedly  between  the
society  and  the  defendant  in  the  character  of  a  member,
and  there  may  be  strong  reasons  for  saying  that,  if  the
claim  had  been  entirely  confined  to  a  right  on  the  part  of
the  plaintiff  of  that  description,  then  the  case  which  was
referred  to  of  Crisp  v.  Bunbury,  ■would  apply,  and  the  plea
would  be  good  ;  therefore  the  demurrer  ought  not  to  be
allowed,  and  the  defendant  would  be  entitled  to  judgment.
But  it  is  clear  that  some  of  the  breaches  relied  upon  by
the  plaintiffs,  for  instance,  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  to  Lord
Cadogan,  were  matters  not  between  the  defendant  as  a
member  of  the  society  and  the  society  ;  they  were  merely
between  the  defendant  and  the  society  as  a  mortgagor.
Now,  we  are  of  opinion  that  if  any  other  rule  be  established
than  that  the  dispute  must  be  with  the  party  as  member—
if  we  go  beyond  that  one  step—the  consequence  would  be,
that  any  extraneous  matter  of  any  sort  that  might  happen  to
arise  between  the  society  and  any  of  its  members,  having
no  connection  with  the  society,  would  become  the  subjectmatter
  of  reference.  It  appears  to  us,  therefore,  the  words
‘matter  in  dispute’  must  be  read  ‘matter  in  difference