135
ON SLAVE TRADE (EAST COAST OF AFRICA).
possessions formed thereafter a dependency of the kingdom, and succeeding Imams ruled
over them, either wholly or in part, according as they were successful against the different
attempts made by the inhabitants under their native chiefs to shake off’ all subjection to
the Arab Sovereigns of Oman. It was in this way that the late Syud Saeed obtained
the sovereignty of Zanzibar and a few of the settlements on the coast. They became his in
virtue of his succession to the Imamship. True, he extended the empire in that direction
and consolidated it ; but it appears very questionable whether on such grounds alone
he can be fairly held to have possessed the power of disposing of the same either by will
or otherwise to his sons or to anyone else. As he himself became master of Zanzibar,
and of other places which from time to time had been added to the dependency, when he
was recognised as Sovereign of Oman, so, in like manner, it seems to follow as a matter
of right that his successor in the sovereignty should succeed to the same privilege, unless
on other more valid grounds he possessed the power of alienating the territories of the
state, which, to say the least, is very doubtful. Judging, indeed, from the limited prerogative
in such matters exercised by his predecessors, the inference would be decidedly
against him.
21. I must now notice in the last place Syud Thoweynee’s plea, that under the circumstances
of his position, and agreeably with the custom of his predecessors in similar
cases, he was fully justified in attempting to coerce his brother Syud Majeed into an
acknowledgement of his supremacy.
22. His Highness here assumes that his title to the supremacy is unquestionable, and
if that point could be admitted, I presume that few would dispute the inference. His
object in the foregoing allegation is designed to prove that, in imitation of the almost
uniform example of his predecessors for ages past, he was free to establish his right by the
additional argument of might ; and as the success of the latter has always prevailed to
confirm the former, his claim would not have come short in that respect.
23. Apart from all considerations of the enlightened motives which led the Government
to intervene, in order to prevent hostilities between Syud Thoweynee and his brother
Syud Majeed, and regarding the matter simply in the light which custom immemorial
leads the Arabs of Oman to regard it, the sanctions of so many precedents among their
rulers whose titles to the sovereignty were established chiefly on the ground of their
success against other competitors, give a plausibility to the argument of Syud
Thoweynee which should not be overlooked.
24. It is perhaps difficult to say what the result would have been had the two parties
come into collision on the occasion of Syud Thowey nee’s expedition to Zanzibar in the
early part of last year. Colonel Rigby,* in his account of the preparations made by
Syud Majeed to resist the expected invasion, represents the means at the disposal of the
latter as ample to destroy any force brought against him, dwelling especially on the
enthusiasm of the people in his cause. Subsequently, however, and long after the
expedition of Syud Thoweynee had returned to Muscat, his report of the state of
affairs at Zanzibar led the Government to conclude that “ the position of Syud Majeed
“ at Zanzibar was not secure.”! And later still, on the occasion of the outbreak, when
the El-Harth Arabs rose in support of Syud Bargluish, all the force which Syud
Majeed could bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising was not suppressed
until assistance from three British men-oi-war had been sent to co-operate with them,j:
when, as it is averred, the Arabs yielded because they would not fio-ht against the
English.
25. I have deemed it desirable, in giving Syud Thowey nee’s arguments in his own
behalf, to explain and illustrate them with the foregoing remarks. As some of the latter,
however, may be open to modification hereafter, I abstain at present from any final
expression of opinion on the general subject. Nevertheless, as what has already been
advanced may have an important bearing on that opinion, I submit the same without
delay to the careful consideration of Government.
Sohâr.
26. Before entering upon the merits of the question relative to the agreement alleged
to have been made between Syud Thoweynee and Majeed for the payment of 40,000
dollars annually by the latter to the former, I consider this the most fit place in my
Report to discuss the claim which has been set up in favour of the independence of
Syud Toorkee, another of the sons of the late Imam, who is at present located at
Sohar.
27. No documentary evidence whatever exists to support this claim. Colonel
Hamerton, in a letter to the Earl of Clarendon,^ dated 10th November 1856, writes as
“follows: “ I am fully aware what his Highness’s (Syud Saeed’s) intentions regarding
“ the succession were ; that Syud Thoweynee at Muscat should succeed to the govern-“
ment of his Arabian possessions, provision being made for certain of his sons as
“ governors of certain places in his Arabian possessions ; and that the Prince Majeed,
“ whom his Highness considered in the place of his deceased son Ivhaled, should succeed
“ to the government of his African possessions, provision being made for others of his
“ sons as governors of various places in his African possessions.” It is obvious that by
the term “ governor ” in the above quotation nothing more is meant than a deputy with
0116. R 4 delegated
Appendix, No. 8,
♦Letter, No. 19 oí
1859.
f Resolution of
Honourable Board,
16th November
1859.
t Letter, No. 98,
-1st October 1859.
§ Quoted by Colonel
Riaby, Letter
No. 19 of 1859,
dated 17th F ebruary
1859.
