I Essays
negotiation that began at Gertrudenberg and ended
with that war. For the same reason they demanded
and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to the
advantage of France, has always added something
to the power, either of France or the House of Bourbon.
 Even that of 1733, which she commenced with
declarations of her having no ambitious views, and
which finished by a treaty at which the ministers of
France repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing
for herself, in effect gained for her Lorraine, an indemnification
 ten times the value of all her North
American possessions.
In short, security and quiet of princes and states
have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when supported
 by power, for disposing of rights; and such
dispositions have never been looked on as want of
moderation. It has always been the foundation of
the most general treaties. The security of Germany
was the argument for yielding considerable possessions
 there to the Swedes; and the security of Europe
 divided the Spanish monarchy by the partition
treaty, made between powers who had no other
right to dispose of any part of it. There can be no
cession, that is not supposed at least to increase the
power of the party to whom it is made. It is enough
that he has a right to ask it, and that he does it not
merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition.
Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the
kingdom of France as little as any other cession; and
from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurtful
 to any other state. Rather, if peace be an advantage,
 this cession may be such to all Europe.

~60] 21