Introduction 
XV 
brokers’ loans ‘for account of others’ as reported by 
both the New York banks and the stock exchange, 
from $1,627,000,000 at the end of 1927 to $3,361, 
000,000 at the end of 1928, we find the total increase 
of credit, as represented by the bank figures and the 
loans ‘for others’ combined, to have been from 
$57,0%717,000,000 to $61,627,000,000, or 8 per cent, 
a difference as compared with the estimated increase 
of business which can only spell inflation.” 
Other observers had noted symptoms of unusual 
inflation of credit, denoting that the market had 
reached its high and might be on the verge of de- 
cline. Among these were Malcolm C. Rorty,- of 
the International Telephone & Telegraph Company; 
Paul Clay, of United States Shares Corporation, and 
Emerson Wirt Axe. In an article in The Adnnalist 
of October, 18, 1929, Mr. Axe observed that “no 
really sustained advance is to be expected” because 
of the “systematic distributive campaign.” On Sep- 
tember sth, in an address at his Annual National 
Business Conference, Mr. Babson said: “I still re- 
peat what I said at this time last year and the year 
before ;* namely, that sooner or later a crash is com- 
ing which will take the leading stocks and cause a 
decline of from 60 to 80 points in the Dow-Jones 
Barometer.” On the same day, in an interview with 
The Hartford Courant, I stated that while none of 
us was infallible, “there may be a recession of stock 
* At that time (1927) the Dow-Jones average was 194; 60 points 
below which would be 134. The lowest point reached after the 
crash (Nov. 13, 1929) was 199.