Introduction

XV

brokers’ loans ‘for account of others’ as reported by
both the New York banks and the stock exchange,
from $1,627,000,000 at the end of 1927 to $3,361,
000,000 at the end of 1928, we find the total increase
of credit, as represented by the bank figures and the
loans ‘for others’ combined, to have been from
$57,0%717,000,000 to $61,627,000,000, or 8 per cent,
a difference as compared with the estimated increase
of business which can only spell inflation.”
Other observers had noted symptoms of unusual
inflation of credit, denoting that the market had
reached its high and might be on the verge of decline.
 Among these were Malcolm C. Rorty,- of
the International Telephone & Telegraph Company;
Paul Clay, of United States Shares Corporation, and
Emerson Wirt Axe. In an article in The Adnnalist
of October, 18, 1929, Mr. Axe observed that “no
really sustained advance is to be expected” because
of the “systematic distributive campaign.” On September
 sth, in an address at his Annual National
Business Conference, Mr. Babson said: “I still repeat
 what I said at this time last year and the year
before ;* namely, that sooner or later a crash is coming
 which will take the leading stocks and cause a
decline of from 60 to 80 points in the Dow-Jones
Barometer.” On the same day, in an interview with
The Hartford Courant, I stated that while none of
us was infallible, “there may be a recession of stock

* At that time (1927) the Dow-Jones average was 194; 60 points
below which would be 134. The lowest point reached after the
crash (Nov. 13, 1929) was 199.