106 THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE
necessitate this drastic action, were clearly stated™ by a former
President of the Stock Exchange:
Our experience of many years as Governors of the Exchange, and
the experience of previous Governing Committees, is that a small
amount of stock in the list leads to a condition that is dangerous to
ourselves and to our customers, the public; and therefore, in order to
sbviate the danger, when in our opinion that condition has been
reached, we remove the stock from the list or suspend it from deal-
ings. . . . The danger may arise from two causes. A small quantity
of stock is more easily subject to manipulation than a large quantity,
and by means of manipulation people may be induced to buy stock at
very much greater prices than it is worth. The other danger, which
of course is the greatest one we fear, is the subject of a corner in the
stock, which not only hurts the broker and his customer, but de-
moralizes the whole country, the Northern Pacific corner being a case
in point.
The Stock Exchange, therefore, is usually unwilling to list
a very small security issue in the beginning. Moreover, it
watches with particular attention, listed issues whose outstand-
ing amounts have for any reason been considerably decreased.
This sometimes happens when an issue of serial bonds has
almost all been retired, or when in a reorganization some old
stock issue has almost all been converted into a new security
issue. The power to suspend dealings in any listed security, or
to strike it from the list entirely, is and must from the nature
of things be instantly exercised.
The Problem of “Corners.”—It is particularly necessary
when the free and open market for a security has been de-
stroyed by the establishment of a “corner” in it that, for the
protection of the public, trading in it should quickly be halted
on the Exchange. Corners are more difficult of exact defi-
nition than might at first appear. A partial corner in a security
may occur when a single individual or group of individuals
gain possession of either a large majority or all of its floating
supply. A complete corner arises from such an ownership of
TT 18 See testimony of H. K. Pomroy in ‘Money Trust Investigation,” Vol. I, p. 494.