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APPENDIX
the contemporary wide post-war fluctuations in foreign exchange rates.
In behalf of the proposal it was urged that a centralization of the
New York foreign exchange market on the New York Stock Ex-
change would make for uniform and more stable rates, and would
make it possible to standardize market practice and enforce com-
pliance with them in the interest of the public. But it was found
that the existing organization of the New York money market would
not coincide with such a plan, and that further difficulties arese in
standardizing the financial instruments in which the prospective deal-
ings were to occur. The result was that after some discussion, inter-
est in the proposal waned and finally died out.
(XVIIId) “There is one point I think I am justified in referring
to, and that is the influence of the exchange on the international money
market. If we had no general market like the stock exchange, and
no great mass of listed securities which are known abroad as well as
at home, the movements in the international money market would be
much more violent and acute than they now are. Today the ordinary
merchant, or the manufacturer on a large scale, can go about his
business serenely conscious that he will get his money at from 4 to 6
per cent at the outside, and he does not concern himself to see whether
we are exporting gold or not. But if we had no general securities
market by which we could borrow on securities in Europe and sell
drafts to meet demands, you would have a most violent and convulsive
movement of the foreign exchanges, which would react upon the
whole money market. You would have large exports of gold, because
there was no other way of meeting obligations or getting credits
abroad. We have had, as you know, violent fluctuations, in fact, by
reason of the defects in our, currency system, but they would be
multiplied many fold if we could not establish foreign credits. As
you know, there is a class of persons who make it a business of seeking
a profit of a small fraction of 1 per cent when securities are a little
higher here than they are in Paris or a little lower in London than
they are in New York. Their operations tend to keep uniform, com-
paratively uniform, the supply of credit and they influence the foreign
exchange market, and thereby travel toward the same stabilizing
tendency as short-selling and the general functions of the exchange
itself.” (Regulation of the Stock Exchange, p. 189, testimony of
Charles A. Conant.)
(XVIIle) “To close America’s chief securities market, and thereby
render its $40.000.000.000 of listed securities almost non-negotiable,