THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 37 
bear a distinctly peculiar character, and have not been clearly defined in 
international rulings. These problems cover the following: first, whether 
the decisions of local courts may or may not give rise to responsibility; 
secondly, the definition and extent of a denial of justice; and thirdly, whether 
international jurisdiction is or not dependent upon the exhaustion of local 
remedies. 
(b) The principle of respecting and abiding by court decisions is usu- 
ally accepted both in theory and in practice. The question is, to what extent 
should these decisions be upheld? This principle is not based upon the 
autonomy of the judicial system. Neither is it connected with the ancient 
and somewhat mystical conception of justice as a supreme majesty. Nor is 
it possible to consider it as an extension of the doctrine of judicial guaranties 
which establish the binding force of the res adjudicate in the local jurispru- 
dence. The international binding force of judicial decisions is sanctioned 
by the international jurisdiction which the States recognize. All the civil- 
ized nations have, or should have, a judicial organization and substantive and 
procedural laws sufficient to afford proper protection to the rights of per- 
sons who reside in their territory, as well as to the rights of foreign States 
who are fellow members of the Family of Nations. These rights cannot be 
protected by other States. The fact that the governmental functions of the 
State are confined to its territory establishes, therefore, the obligation to 
provide for the proper administration of justice, and this obligation creates 
the right to have the acts incident thereto—which constitute the administra- 
tion of justice—duly respected by the international community. Besides; 
this respect towards judicial action is essential to mutual independence and 
cooperation. It is due to these legal considerations that the decisions which 
the judges render in the national courts should be presumed in international 
circles to be regular and just. 
Up to this point there is no possible discrepancy; but it is necessary to 
determine: (a) when may a court decision be deemed to be the final ruling 
of the judiciary; (b) whether the presumption of regularity and fairness 
carried by every judicial decision may be set aside in certain cases; and (c) 
whenever this presumption is set aside, in what manner would international 
jurisdiction be established ? 
Both in theory and in practice there is also absolute accord on the fact 
that court decisions cannot be considered to give rise to international responsi- 
bility until all the local remedies available to determine their validity have 
been exhausted. 
(¢) But once the decision becomes final, would it be possible to chal- 
lenge it in the international community by reason of the so-called notorious 
or manifest injustice? This problem is, indeed, both difficult and compli- 
cated. In this connection the Institute of International Law adopted the