3g wh : 
“(d) Caused by procedure so faulty as to exclude all reasonable hope Lo ! 
of just decisions.” Cw 
=X. 
Norway accepts the ancient conception of flagrant injustice. Switzer- 
and states that: 
“If the future convention were to lay down that the State is internation- 
ally responsible, not only for judgments contrary to international law given 
by its courts and for manifestly incorrect decisions of the courts, but also for 
a denial of justice in all the forms in which it occurs (including wrongful 
dilatoriness on the part of the courts), we think that it would cover the 
essential points.” 
This theory involves the enforcement of principles of natural justice that 
are far above the will of the State. The substantive rules have not been laid 
down by the States. The application of the rules of construction may give 
rise to discussions among the States, just as it does among individuals, There 
is no reason warranting the prevalence of the view of one State over 
that of the others, when one of them disregards, or objects for special 
reasons, to the presumption of regularity and fairness to which a judicial 
proceeding is entitled. This difficult problem cannot very well be reduced 
to a definite formula that would either eliminate it altogether, or accept it 
without reservation. Neither is it free from dangerous consequences, be- 
cause it might lead to the revision of the decisions of national courts as a 
matter of regular procedure and to improper disregard of the judicial 
authority of the States. Nor could it be altogether eliminated, because it is 
an international question which arises in certain cases of claims due to un- 
usual injustice or corruptive practices. When a State disregards or, for 
special reasons, objects to the presumption of fairness and regularity with 
which a judicial act is invested, this establishes a conflict between two juris- 
dictions: one that is organic and regular (the national judiciary); and the 
other, which is inorganic and irregular, because it is not derived from the 
regular functions of the administration of justice within the States, and 
because it is exercised only on account of a conception based on extraordi- 
nary reasons. The only possible solution for this conflict would be to estab- 
lish a regular organization to pass upon the conflict, in other words, the 
jurisdiction of the community of States. International courts are the only 
ones competent to determine whether it is or not possible to set aside the 
usual presumption of fairness and justice carried by acts of the national 
judiciary. If a State should refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of the inter- 
national community, it could not, without violating the principles of equality, 
raise any objections to the validity of the action of national courts of other 
States. In other words, the decisions of the courts that enforce the munici- 
pal law cannot form the basis of responsibility unless so determined by the