ON SLAVE TRADE (EAST COAST OF AFRICA).
119
thousand pounds sterling; per annum, a sum which, in the present condition of the Zanzibar Appendix, No. 7«
finances, would reduce the State to hopeless insolvency.
38. This consideration forms, in my opinion, the most serious obstacle to the suggestion
proposed, and it will be tor Her Majesty’s Government to decide on the propriety of removing
it by offering to compensate the native Sovereign for the loss, on condition that he formally
gave his consent to the measure through a revised Treaty, and sanctioned our further interference
to see it carried into effect. I notice in the “ Persian Gulf” Government selections,
that on the occasion of our first proposals to the late Sultan Syud Saeed to abolish the
slave trade, his Highness strongly objected, on the ground that “the traffic in slaves was a
“ lucrative one, and without full compensation he could not dream of prohibiting it.
However, he was informed in reply that Her Britannic Majesty was fully aware of the
“ sacrifice lie would make by the adoption of Her Majesty’s views, and was ready, in the
“ event of his Highness’s concurrence in the abolition, to afford him any pecuniary conces-“
sion in reason. This announcement had the desired effect.” The discussion resulted in
the existing Treaty of 1845. I am not aware what amount was to have been paid to his
Highness; but 1 have been given to understand that he eventually declined to receive any
remuneration on that score.
39. I adduce this extract :o show that the idea suggested in the foregoing paragraph has
already been entertained by Her Majesty’s Government, and I certainly deem it advisable
that a similar offer should accompany any further proposal to abolish the slave trade in the
Zanzibar territories. Situated as Syud Majeed is at present, the dispute betwixt him and
his brother regarding the suc( ession not yet dei ided, 1 hesitated from prudential motives,
and lest the proposal might be construed into a covert bribe, to obtain from him any explicit
opinion on the subject; nevertheless I feel fully persuaded that nothing is needed beyond
an insistent urgency, coupled with an offer of reasonable indemnification, and our support
to insure them against any overt acts of their subjects in consequence of the concession, to
obtain the consent either of Syud Thoweynee or Syud Majeed to the measure here suggested
for the more effectual abolition of the slave trade. In my report from Muscat I
communicated to Government what Syud Thoweynee’s views were; and the following
extract from statement of his claims and grievances, delivered to me by Syud Majeed at
Zanzibar, sets forth what his Highness has been pleased, of his own accord, to write on the
same subject. “ Those commissioned by you have had some conversation with me about
‘‘ curtailing the limits within which it is still lawful to transport slaves, and also about
“ abolishing the transport altogether, and whether any aid would be required thereto. I
“ replied that I would never oppose the wishes of the high (British) Government; never-“
theless your lordship is not ignorant of the condition of these countries, and you are
“ doubtless aware that the prosperity of the subjects of these countries is derived t hiefly
“ from ploughing and sowing, and that such prosperity cannot be maintained without
“slaves. But your opinion is best.” The objection is a natural one ; but the drift of the
quotation suffices to show that there is no chance of its being persevered in contrary to the
wishes of the British Government.
40. I take it for granted that the offer originally made to the late Syud Saeed did not
imply that our payment of an indemnity should be perpetual. In like manner I would
limit any such offer in the present instance to a term of 10 or 20 years. The commerce of
the country, and the revenues of the Zanzibar state, have quadrupled since the Treaty of
1845, and with prudent foresight and proper Government, a corresponding increase may be
anticipated hereafter, more especially if the further abolition of slavery now proposed is
carried into effect. Besides, there is no lesson which the Arabs need so much to learn as
that of self-reliance ; and the prospect of a perpetual subsidy from the British, would only
send to foster a moral weakness which is the bane of their native rulers.
41. In the event of Her Majesty’s Government deeming it advisable to adopt the recommendations
now made for the further suppression of slavery in the Zanzibar dominions, I
trust that it will be found practicable to secure the co-operation of France and of the United
States of America in the benevolent enterprise. Situated as the ruler of Zanzibar is, he is
scrupulously anxious to be on the best terms with foreign powers generally, and when the
views of the latter are not in unison, the want of accord begets a vacillating line of conduct
on his part injurious to his own cbaiacter as an independent sovereign, and prejudicial to
all improvement among his people. Mote especially is unanimity desirable where the
object is to suppress a popular institution w hich, though ju'^tly reprobated by all Christian
pow ers, is regarded by the Arabs as a national privilege, and the chief source of their wealth
and prospeiity on the East Coast of Africa. In fact, were they not fully convinced of their
own utter inability, unsupported by extraneous aid, to resist any such demand on our part,
the Arabs would never consent to the imposition of any additional restrictions on the slave
trade within their territories. Hence, although the knowledge that one or more of the
foreign powers had declined to co-operate with the British to that end might not deter the
Arabs from yielding to our e.\elusive solicitation, nevertheless it is easy to foresee that they
Would avail themselves of the countenance which that fact would seemingly afford them, to
neutralise, as far as possible, our every effort for the more effectual abolition of slavery ;
nothing more, however, is required to frustrate such an evasive policy on their part, and to
prevent the international misunderstandings which may be engendered thereby, than that
the two Governments above named should join with (%reat Britain in decreasing the abolition
of slavery on the East Coast of Africa. I presume that the consent of the United States
0.116. F 4 would
