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APPENDIX  OF  CASES.

Act  was  in  force,  but  after  the  passing  of  the  Industrial
and  Provident  Societies  Act,  1862  (25  &  26  Viet.  c.  87),  it
obtained  a  certificate  of  registration  under  it.  The  debt
sought  to  be  recovered  was  incurred  before  the  passing  of
the  last-mentioned  Act,  but  the  action  was  commenced
after.  The  case  was  tried  before  Martin,  B.,  at  Westminster, ­
  and  a  verdict  was  found  for  the  plaintiff,  leave
being  reserved  to  the  defendants  to  move  to  enter  a  nonsuit
if  the  court  should  be  of  opinion  that  they  were  not  liable
in  their  corporate  capacity.
Macnamam  in  this  term  moved  to  enter  a  nonsuit  accordingly. ­

Gates  now  showed  cause.
Martin,  B.—We  are  all  of  opinion  that  this  rule  must
be  made  absolute.  The  case  is  governed  by  that  of  Dean  v.
Millard.  In  that  case  the  action  was  brought  against  the
individual  members,  and  the  court  held  that  it  was  well
brought,  on  the  ground  that  though  for  the  sake  of  convenience, ­
  before  the  late  statute,  the  names  of  public  officers
were  to  be  used  in  actions  against  the  society,  yet  the  real
cause  of  action  was  against  the  individual  members,  and
they  were  ultimately  liable.  Williams,  J.,  there  says:—
“  That  argument”  (referring  to  the  argument  for  the  defendants) ­
  “  would  have  been  admissible  if  the  legislature,  instead
of  saying,  as  they  have  done  in  sect.  6,  that  the  certificate
of  registration  shall  vest  in  the  society  all  the  property
that  may  at  the  time  be  vested  in  any  person  in  trust  for
the  society,  and  all  legal  proceedings  then  pending  by  or
against  any  such  trustee  or  other  officer  on  account  of  the
society  may  be  prosecuted  by  or  against  the  society  in  its
registered  name  without  abatement,  had  gone  on  to  say
that  all  claims  and  rights  of  action  existing  at  the  time  of
the  passing  of  the  Act  might  be  so  prosecuted.  But  they
have  not  said  so;  they  have  confined  the  indulgence  to
actions  pending  at  the  time  of  the  obtaining  of  the  certificate ­
  of  registration.  That  must  mean  actions  commenced
before  the  passing  of  25  &  26  Viet.  c.  87,  because  none
could  be  commenced  after  against  any  but  existing
members.”  I  was  much  struck  by  Mr.  Gates’s  argument
on  the  construction  of  the  6th  section,  but  we  cannot  adopt
Iris  construction  in  opposition  to  the  Court  of  Common
Pleas.

Bramwell,  B.—I  was  much  struck  with  Mr.  Gates’s
^argument  on  the  6th  section  that  it  could  not  be  meant  to