The Industrial Revolution

Bibliographic data

Monograph

Identifikator:: 1027928145

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-159926

Document type:: Monograph

Author:: Cunningham, William http://d-nb.info/gnd/128907487

Title:: The Industrial Revolution

Place of publication:: Cambridge

Publisher:: The University Press

Year of publication:: 1922

Scope:: xxii S., S. 404-886

Digitisation:: 2021

Collection:: Economics Books

Usage license:: Get license information via the feedback formular.

J 2 T £ S tf al i. Je h Y 'he ne PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER PUBLIC BORROWING 409 from the legislative body and was forced from time to time AD. 1659 os ; ~—1776. to justify itself to an elected assembly. But this was not all clear gain; parliamentary legislation was a much more a puss . . « « cally con- cumbrous instrument for regulating industry and commerce trolled. the than the administrative machinery which had been in 29min vogue in the time of Elizabeth or Charles I. Under these system monarchs the Privy Council had been able to watch the course of affairs from day to day, and to issue temporary orders which were enforced by the justices; Parliament had to be content with more general measures! and had no means of adapting them to circumstances from time to time. The Corn Bounty Law took account of an immense variety of conditions, and was intended to be a self-acting measure, under which a useful control might be exercised over the corn trade, and a steady stimulus given to agriculture. It was not possible, however, to devise similar means for dealing with the changing circumstances of commercial or manufacturing pursuits. Nor was Parliament in a position bo give special concessions to individuals in order to pro- mote any special branch of industry; the favourite expedient of the legislature was that of voting bounties. These re- wards were open to all who practised the art which it was intended to encourage, and thus had no exclusive character; but whereas the system of patents had been inexpensive to the Government, this new scheme was very costly, as 16 proved « . cu: rous afforded a minimum of advantage to the public at a and costly maximum of cost to the State? Such grants were only boo likely to call forth fraudulent attempts to obtain the bounties, without regard to the conditions on which they were offered. Malpractices of various kinds appear to have occurred in the linen? and had to be guarded against in old traditions. Compare W. G. Caxroll, Life of Hely Hutchinson, Introduction to the Commercial Restraints of Ireland, p. Lxviii. 1 Ag had been advocated by Milles, see above, p. 223. The English method of settling all details by legislation rendered the system much less flexible than would have been the case if the practice of the French legislature had been adopted. See p. 207 n. 2, above. ? Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, ‘On Bounties,’ Book rv. chapter 5. ¥ ¢ Whereas by reason of the bounty or allowances granted on the exportation of British and Irish linens, evil-minded persons may fraudulently endeavour to export linens of foreign fabrick and manufacture, and to receive the said bounties or allowances for the same, as if the same were of the manufacture of Great Britain and Ireland: and whereas certain stamps are required by law, to be put

Access restriction

Copyright

fullscreen: The Industrial Revolution

Monograph

Table of contents

Download

Monograph

This page

Image fragment

Citation links

Citation recommendation