Die Kaufkraft des Geldes

The stock market crash - and after

Bibliographic data

Monograph

Identifikator:: 1028803699

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-43559

Document type:: Monograph

Author:: Fisher, Irving http://d-nb.info/gnd/118533541; Brown, Harry Gunnison http://d-nb.info/gnd/123548152

Title:: Die Kaufkraft des Geldes

Place of publication:: Berlin

Publisher:: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer

Year of publication:: 1916

Scope:: 1 Online-Ressource (XX, 435 Seiten)

Digitisation:: 2018

Collection:: Economics Books

Usage license:: Get license information via the feedback formular.

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Document type:: Monograph

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: XII. Kapitel. Statistiken der letzten Jahre

Collection:: Economics Books

50 The Stock Market Crash—dAnd After deserved from the speculative public.” This, he says, resulted in the New York City banks with- drawing their support of the growing account of brokers’ loans from October, 1927, to October, 1929, which in turn resulted in the market depend- ing more and more upon the irresponsible loans “for others,” these “others” meaning business concerns having large loanable funds. This constituted an element of instability. On this subject a correspond- ent comments anonymously as follows: “I feel that the money market aspects of the panic, as far as they arose from the large amount of loans by other lenders, cannot be dissociated from the previous open market policy of the Federal Reserve System, which, through establishing artifi- cially tight money conditions, raised the rate on call loans and attracted other lenders’ funds into them.” Overextension of Loans Another bankers’ view is represented by M. H. Cahill, President of the Plaza Trust Company of New York, and formerly President of the New York State Bankers’ Association. Mr. Cahill says in the Manufacturers’ Record of Baltimore (issue of November, 1929): “Every banker in the country had, for several months previous to the break in the market, been demanding from 40 per cent to 100 per cent margins on collateral loans. This fact in itself was conclusive evidence that the banker knew that the stocks he was accepting as security for loans were priced at fictitious levels. Under

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