Répertoire des administrateurs & commissaires de société, des banques, banquiers et agents de change de France et de Belgique

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Monograph

Identifikator:: 1751319059

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-129553

Document type:: Monograph

Title:: Répertoire des administrateurs & commissaires de société, des banques, banquiers et agents de change de France et de Belgique

Place of publication:: Paris [u.a.]

Year of publication:: [1926]

Scope:: 1316 S.

Digitisation:: 2021

Collection:: Economics Books

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Chapter

Document type:: Monograph

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: Règlement de la Bourse des fonds publics de Bruxelles

Collection:: Economics Books

50 The Stock Market Crash—dAnd After deserved from the speculative public.” This, he says, resulted in the New York City banks with- drawing their support of the growing account of brokers’ loans from October, 1927, to October, 1929, which in turn resulted in the market depend- ing more and more upon the irresponsible loans “for others,” these “others” meaning business concerns having large loanable funds. This constituted an element of instability. On this subject a correspond- ent comments anonymously as follows: “I feel that the money market aspects of the panic, as far as they arose from the large amount of loans by other lenders, cannot be dissociated from the previous open market policy of the Federal Reserve System, which, through establishing artifi- cially tight money conditions, raised the rate on call loans and attracted other lenders’ funds into them.” Overextension of Loans Another bankers’ view is represented by M. H. Cahill, President of the Plaza Trust Company of New York, and formerly President of the New York State Bankers’ Association. Mr. Cahill says in the Manufacturers’ Record of Baltimore (issue of November, 1929): “Every banker in the country had, for several months previous to the break in the market, been demanding from 40 per cent to 100 per cent margins on collateral loans. This fact in itself was conclusive evidence that the banker knew that the stocks he was accepting as security for loans were priced at fictitious levels. Under

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