no
WAR BORROWING
debtedness upon the volume of credit and the level
of prices will be studied.
The avoidance of monetary dislocation has been
an avowed purpose of the Treasury in the use of
certificates of indebtedness in conjunction with its
borrowing policy. This intention has been reiterated
to the degree, it might be almost objected, of
under-emphasis upon the real end which the certificate
issues were designed to serve — the maintenance
of the Treasury balance.
At the outset of our war financing there was no
such expressed purpose. The report of the Ways
and Means Committee of March 3, 1917, accompanying
the war revenue bill recommended an
increase in the authorized volume of certificates of
indebtedness on the score that “ under the present
system of taxation a considerable portion of the receipts
are not due and payable until the last month
of each fiscal year.” Similarly, the ante-bellum
issue of $50,000,000 certificates offered on March
27, as well as the contemplated additional issue of
like amount to be emitted before the end of the fiscal
year, were described as “ in anticipation of the payment
of the corporation and individual income taxes
due in June, 1917”—with no intimation of other
service.
The further purpose which certificate borrowing
was designed to serve might be regarded as foreshadowed
in the First Liberty Loan act in the increase
in the authorized volume of certificates of indebtedness
from $300,000,000 to $2,000,000,000 —
a sum obviously in excess of what was needed to