VI

THE  FUTURE
In  undertaking  to  estimate  the  war  borrowing  policy
of  the  United  States  at  this  time,  two  purposes
govern  —  suggestion  and  criticism.  In  the  first
place,  the  Treasury  faces  the  necessity  of  further
large  scale  borrowing  even  after  the  cessation  of
actual  fighting,  with  the  consequent  possibility  that
the  lessons  of  the  past  may  induce  some  change  in
the  practices  of  the  future.  In  the  second  place,  attention ­
  may  properly  be  directed  in  objective  criticism ­
  even  at  this  early  date  to  certain  phases  of  our
borrowing  activity  which  as  tested  by  historical  precedent, ­
  by  theoretical  analysis  and  by  positive  result
may  be  fairly  described  as  unwise.
It  is  certain  that  the  aftermath  of  the  war  from
which  the  United  States  is  now  gradually  emerging
will  call  for  further  use  of  public  credit.  This  has
been  recognized  as  a  requirement  of  national  demobilization ­
  and  has  been  incorporated  into  the  fiscal
program  of  the  administration.  It  is  equally  certain
that  the  sums  to  be  raised  by  borrowing  in  the  next
twelve  months,  though  less  relative  to  the  total
budget,  will  attain  large  proportions.  The  total
cash  disbursements  of  the  United  States  in  the  fiscal
year  ending  June  30,  1918,  were  something  under
$13,000,000  of  which  about  two-thirds  were  secured
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