76
III.—CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.
made to the remuneration of the employees by the bonus on wages
which they have received is shown in the Table below: —•
Ratio of Bonus to Wages in Profit-sharing Retail
Distributive (Store) Societies, 1899-1910.
[Compiled from. Returns made to the Co-operative Union, to the Labour Department,
and to the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.]
Year.
No. of Profit-sharing Employees at end
of year.
Patio of Bonus to Wages and
Salaries.
Distributive
Departments.
Productive
Departments.
Total.
Distribu
tive De
partments
Productive
Depart
ments.
Both De
partments
together.
1899
12,101
1,075
13,176
Per cent.
6-1
Per cent.
6'7
Per cent.
6-2
1900
#
#
12,018
*
#
5-2
1901
10,282
1,903
12,185
5’3
4-9
5-3
1902
11,110
1,931
13,041
5-4
5-3
5-3
1903
11,756
2,314
14,070
5-4
5-0
5-4
1904
12,771
2,448
15,219
5-5
5-2
5-4
1905
14,132
2,465
16,597
5-3
5-1
5-2
1906
14,680
2,738
17,418
5-1
5-0
5-1
1907
15,006
2,736
17,742
5-1
5-1
5-1
1908
14,017
2,905
16,922
5-0
4-9
5-0
1909
13,958
2,792
16,750
4-6
4-6
4-6
1910
14,411
2,829
17,240
4-5
4-6
4-5
Note.—A Society is not included in the Tabic for any year in which it did not allot a
sum to employees.
* Cannot be stated.
It will be seen that the ratio of bonus to wages in the distri
butive and productive departments of these Societies respectively
has varied but slightly during the twelve years covered by the
Table, having during the greater part of this period been a little
over 5 per cent., though it has fallen below this figure in the last
two years.
Shareholding by Employees.
The membership of Retail Distributive Societies, as of Co
operative Societies of every type, is invariably open, subject to
election by the Committee of Management, so that there is no
difficulty in the employees becoming shareholders, and it is believed
that in most cases they do so. In regard to the extent of the
control capable of being exercised by the employees at meetings
of the shareholders, it must be borne in mind that the rule in these
Societies is one member one vote, irrespective of the number of
shares held by each. As to their direct influence upon the pro
ceedings of the Committee of Management, it may be stated that
it is very unlikely that in any appreciable number of cases em