THE FIXING OF RATES 29) 
the Commission because of the changed conditions it is because 
there is a new reasonable rate to be ascertained and disclosed, 
applicable to such new conditions and fixed by force of law 
immediately when the new conditions came into existence. But 
the theory and the mandate of the law is that this point is 
always discoverable although not always discovered. Until it 
is discovered and made known the former rates and service pre- 
vail. The order of the Commission is prima facie evidence that 
the rate, charge or service found and fixed by it is the particular 
rate, charge or service declared by the Legislature in general 
terms to be lawful and to be in force. If jt were conceded that 
the Commission had power or discretion to fix one of several 
rates, either of which would be just and reasonable, it would be 
hard to say that this was not a delegation of pure legislative 
power to the Commission. But the theory of this law is to dele- 
gate to the Commission the power to ascertain facts and to make 
mere administrative regulations. 
“ The notion that commissions of this kind should be closely 
restricted by the courts, and that justice in our day can be had 
only in courts, is not conducive to the best results. Justice dwells 
with us as with the fathers; it is not exclusively the attribute 
of any office or class, it responds more rapidly to confidence than 
to criticism, and there is no reason why the members of the great 
Railroad Commission of this State should not develop and es- 
tablish a system of rules and precedents as wise and beneficent 
within their sphere of action as those established by the early 
common-law judges. We find the statute well framed to bring 
this about.” 
Competition in the Public Service. — Before the advantage 
of cooperation and combination leading to monopolistic control 
was fully realized by the owners of business ventures, it was 
common belief that free and unrestricted competition should be 
encouraged and would result in permanent advantage to the 
public. The fallacy of this view when large public service con- 
cerns are involved is now generally recognized. The competi- 
tion in the case of such concerns may result in a momentary 
lessening of rates but in the long run the rate-payer or the security 
holder will be the sufferer. The temporary advantages may be- 
come a permanent burden. 
TAC