I Essays 
negotiation that began at Gertrudenberg and ended 
with that war. For the same reason they demanded 
and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to the 
advantage of France, has always added something 
to the power, either of France or the House of Bour- 
bon. Even that of 1733, which she commenced with 
declarations of her having no ambitious views, and 
which finished by a treaty at which the ministers of 
France repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing 
for herself, in effect gained for her Lorraine, an in- 
demnification ten times the value of all her North 
American possessions. 
In short, security and quiet of princes and states 
have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when sup- 
ported by power, for disposing of rights; and such 
dispositions have never been looked on as want of 
moderation. It has always been the foundation of 
the most general treaties. The security of Germany 
was the argument for yielding considerable posses- 
sions there to the Swedes; and the security of Eu- 
rope divided the Spanish monarchy by the partition 
treaty, made between powers who had no other 
right to dispose of any part of it. There can be no 
cession, that is not supposed at least to increase the 
power of the party to whom it is made. It is enough 
that he has a right to ask it, and that he does it not 
merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition. 
Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the 
kingdom of France as little as any other cession; and 
from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurt- 
ful to any other state. Rather, if peace be an ad- 
vantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. 
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