THE MONETARY CRISIS 59 
had been presented to Germany, and 100 marks, which 
were still being quoted in Paris at 22 francs (monthly 
average for April), fell below 19 in May, gradually reached 
14, 13 (in September), and then suddenly, after the request 
for a moratorium, touched 9-6 in October. Finally, after 
remaining round 3-8 in May and June 1922, the exchange 
fell below 1 franc in September of the same year, and 
below 10 centimes in February 1923 after the occupation 
of the Ruhr. Even so, the rate of 6 centimes reached at 
this time was only the starting point for a new course of 
depreciation. For after having been supported by the 
Reichsbank until about April, the mark thenceforward, 
in spite of intermittent attempts to support it, suffered 
an almost continuous depreciation, of which the following 
table gives some idea : 
Paris rate of the = New York rate of 
mark in francs. the mark in cents. 
April 17th, 1923 0°0007 0°0044 
July 1st. : 0'000125 0°0006 
August 1st ‘ 0'0000175 ©" 008.00 
September 4th . 0000001 0003. 
This last rate is equivalent to more than §8 million 
marks to the pound at Berlin, and nearly 13 million to the 
dollar. On October 10th the dollar was worth 871 million 
marks (the depreciation of the latter exceeding that of the 
rouble), and on October 22nd 43 milliards, and at the 
beginning of 1924 and after a more rapid decline ! finally 
reached a level of 4210 § milliards, at which it remained 
fairly stable. (For the circumstances of this stabilisation 
and the Rentenmark, see § 8.) 
§ 5. Causes of the aggravation of the crisis in the Allied 
countries. 
It becomes fairly clear why the exchange crisis was 
aggravated in countries where it occurred, if we confine 
ourselves to considering it in outline. Among the Allies, 
1 Valued in gold pfennigs, the mark went from 2} at the end of 1921 to 
100 at the end of 1922, and to T5555.655 500 at the end of 1923.