b.7 5 
It is also a well-known canon of construction that a legislature is 
not presumed to intend any substantial alteration in the law 
beyond what it explicitly declares or, in other words, beyond the 
scope and object of the statute. In this connection I need only 
point out that the words used are the very reverse of explicit, and 
that the object and scope of the Ordinance itself was the establish- 
ment of Courts of Justice in the Protectorate and the definition of 
their respective jurisdictions. 
There remains section 8 of the Protectorate Ordinance 1924, and 
that, in. my opinion, is the real crux of the argument for and against 
the learned Judge's decision. Now, the first seven sub-sections of 
this section prohibit certain acts in relation to slave dealing in an 
absolute and unqualified manner, but the eighth sub-section 
prohibits a certain act when done unlawfully,” that is, the act 
of compelling the service of any person by any species of coercion 
or restraint. What is the meaning of * unlawfully >’? After 
considering every authority I have been able to discover, I adopt 
the meaning given to the term by Stephen J. in Regina v. Clarence, 
22 Q.B.D., page 23, where he says that the expression * unlaw- 
ful ”* in its ordinary import means ‘‘ forbidden by some definite 
law >. I must next ask myself, has the exercise of the right of 
re-capture where no bodily harm is done being forbidden by any 
definite provision contained in the laws applying to the Protec- 
torate ; and the answer seems to me to be in the negative.  More- 
over, it is quite easy to give this sub-section a useful meaning 
without applying it to the reasonable acts of a master in relation to 
his own slave. Thus, it would clearly be an act of unlawful com- 
pulsion for a person to coerce any other person except his own 
slave to serve him; and it would, I submit, be unlawful compul- 
sion for a master to coerce even his own slave to serve him if the 
latter was able and anxious to purchase his freedom under section 
7 of the same Ordinance. This solves the conundrum that the 
local Legislature has presented to us, at any rate so far as T am 
concerned. I hold that the defendants in each of these two cases 
should have been acquitted, and that the judgments of convictions 
in the Court below should be set aside and judgments of acquittal 
in lieu thereof be pronounced and. entered in the Court Records. 
[ should add, perhaps, that both the slaves in question were re- 
captured in the Protectorate. Had they succeeded in escaping to 
the Colony it is obvious that their masters could not have touched 
them so long as they resided there. 
Delivered this 1st day of July, 1927. 
J. ATEN, J.