234 THE ZEMSTVOS DURING THE WAR 
whilst the department is being deluged with telegrams stating that the 
front is desperately in need of provisions. . . . Lastly, the decision 
that no special transport orders are to be issued to the Unions because 
of the extreme disorganization of the railway traffic and that they are 
to depend entirely on the Army Supply Department. The organization 
of the latter, however, suffers from many defects, its stocks are fre- 
quently inadequate, the requests of such zemstvo institutions as can- 
teens, infant asylums, and the like, are often rejected and when granted 
it is only after considerable delays. . . .%® 
Accurate figures covering the entire period of the operation of 
the zemstvo depots at the front are not available. To convey an idea 
of the scope of their work, however, we shall here quote some figures 
regarding the turnover of the depots of the southwestern front, 
which ranked second.®* 
In the total turnover of the depots of the southwestern front up 
to January, 1916, clothing and underwear rank first in value with 
41.94 per cent of the total. Next follow: foodstuffs, 20.45 per cent; 
harness and transport accessories, 15.66 per cent; domestic equip- 
ment, 9.57 per cent; fodder, 6.78 per cent; tools and technical 
goods, 1.53 per cent; oil, petroleum, and benzine, 1.14 per cent; 
building materials, 1.03 per cent; and sundry articles, 2.90 per 
cent. 
Each union’s committee of the front maintained a special trans- 
port section which had charge of the transport of stores. Every pos- 
sible method of conveyance was used. In the Caucasus, for instance, 
camel caravans were making their way along narrow mountain 
tracks under the flag of the Zemstvo Union. On Lakes Urmia and 
Van, again, there were zemstvo barges and tugs at work. On the 
Dnieper and its tributaries on the southwestern front a vast fleet of 
barges was busy transporting cargoes. As for the motor lorries im- 
ported from abroad, they began to reach the front only during the 
second half of the War, and even then it was found impossible to use 
them as extensively as had been expected, owing to the bad condition 
of the roads. 
In these circumstances it was inevitable that horse-drawn vehicles 
should remain till the very end of the campaign the principal means 
of transport along these roads. Down to September 15, 1916, the 
38 Izvestia (Bulletin), Nos. 52-53, pp. 253-254. 
34 Ibid., Nos. 45-46, pp. 138-139.