138 THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM OF MOSLEM INDIA
half the actual produce was to be left to the peasants, and
it draws a distinction (H. 10) between calamities occurring
before, and after, the crops were cut; allowance was to be
made for the former, but not for the latter, a rule which sur-
vivedinthe administrative tradition of the nineteenth century.
The administration was required to see that exactions
from peasants were limited to the lawful demands, and
three classes of prohibited exactions are specified (R. 10).
The first consists of those cesses which had been forbidden
by the Emperor, who followed in this matter the general
line taken by Firtiz and by Akbar. The second is “charges
in excess of the revenue,” which may be interpreted as
customary levies made by officials. The third is described
by the word baliya, which in ordinary use may mean either
“misfortune” or “oppression”; here it probably denotes
some particular form of oppression which was common at
the time, but I have found no illustrative passages to assist
in its interpretation. So much is clear, that various forms
of exaction prevailed, and that they were definitely pro-
hibited; how far the prohibition was effective remains a
matter for conjecture.
The orders which have been summarised above applied
primarily only to the Reserved areas, a small fraction of the
Empire, but their provisions were intended, at the least,
to set a standard of procedure in Assignments, for the
officials employed by assignees were to be urged to act in
accordance with them. Here again it is a matter for con-
jecture how far these orders took effect. Aurangzeb’s local
administration was not characterised by efficiency, so that
assignees probably enjoyed more freedom than in Akbar’s
days; but a curious provision suggests that the provincial
Diwan was in fact in a position to influence the local staff
employed by assignees. He was required (R. 12) to report
on the loyalty and efficiency of the assessors and collectors
employed in Assignments, and a promise was given that
punishment should follow on an unfavourable report. It
is not easy to understand how the Revenue Ministry could
ensure the punishment of subordinates employed by an
assignee, but the promise is there, and we must infer that,
in some wav or other, it could be made effective.