omar. 11] THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 999 
of the Commonwealth Constitution for the amendment of the 
Constitution require the assent of the states affected to such 
alterations as affect the proportionate representation of the 
state in either House or its limits, &c., or in any manner 
affect the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, 
and thus the provision for amendment itself can only be 
amended out of existence with the consent of the state in 
question. 
The only other provision affecting the amendment of the 
Constitution in the first draft was that contained in the 
schedule which forbids amendment of the schedule unless 
the Bill for amending it be reserved. The position was 
thus in strong contrast with the condition of affairs either 
in Canada or in Australia. 
In the case of Canada the Constitution is regarded as not 
being liable to alteration except in a certain number of minor 
points, under which power of alteration is expressly given 
by the British North America Act, 1867, save by an Act of 
the Imperial Parliament itself. The reason for this is, as 
was recognized in 1907,! when the question of the alteration 
of the subsidies payable to the provinces was under considera- 
tion, that the Act of 1867 is of the nature of a quasi treaty 
between the provinces which then joined, and this provision 
should therefore only be modified by an external authority, 
and not by an authority like the Federal Parliament created 
by the Act itself. It does not appear that there is any 
desire in Canada to alter the position in this regard, which 
must be considered as a satisfactory safeguard for provincial 
interests against any possible encroachment by the Federal 
Government. 
In the Commonwealth? the desire for immunity from ex- 
ternal interference has led to a curious compromise ; the 
1 See Colonial Office letter, June 5, 1907, printed in British Columbia 
Sessional Papers, 1908, C. 1. The suggestion in The Framework of Union, 
p. 196, as to the Parliament's power of alteration is untenable. 
* 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12, Const, s. 128. The idea that the Imperial Parlia- 
ment has given up its own power of alteration is, of course, untenable 
(cf. ibid., p. 197; B. Holland, Imperium et Libertas, p. 184).