ARGUMENTS IN THE NEGATIVE
————————— BCA TIVE
daily holdings of all reserve banks in bills discounted was 57% of total bills and
securities, the percentage in one of these regional banks did not get above 519% and
was as low as 7%, the percentage for the second ranged from 79% down to 16%,
and the percentage for the third went as high as 50% and as low as 6%. On December
[8, 1929, the percentages for these three banks were 25%, 57%, and 37%, and for
all twelve reserve banks together was 469%.
With the modern facilities for transportation and communica-
tion it is not apparent why the rediscount rate for paper of the same
quality and the same maturity should not be the same at any par
ticular time throughout the country.
The argument in favor of different discount rates in the various reserve districts
was stated as follows, in 1921, by a Federal Reserve Agent: “Obviously the same
>ank rate cannot be charged in Massachusetts and Montana because of the difference in
conditions. In the partially developed sections capital is scarce and credit is limited.
The northwestern states have for years found it highly beneficial to attract eastern
money by making favorable rates. * * * Ap equal or uniform level would nat-
urally destroy this advantage since individuals in the East having surplus funds could
:mploy them at the same rate at home and there would be no reason for sending money
out into the West.”
Statements of this kind seem to contain an element of fallacy; for in the period in
which the quoted statement was written the rediscount rates of western reserve banks
frequently were below those at the same time in effect in eastern districts. Indeed, this
has on occasion continued to be the case. For example, at the end of 1928 the rate in
‘he four western districts was 414%, whereas in the other districts it was 5%. In the
middle of December, 1929, the rate was 414% at the reserve banks of Boston, New
York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco, whereas it was 5% at the
reserve banks of Philadelphia, Richmond, Cleveland, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and
Dallas. It can be fairly argued, of course, that there can scarcely be any justification
in considerations which should be given weight in central banking for a difference in
rates between New York and Philadelphia, between Richmond and Atlanta, or be-
tween St. Louis and Kansas City.
The fallacy may be in a confusion of loans of one quality with those of another.
The time has come, it may fairly be argued, when a loan of the highest quality accord-
ing to all banking tests should be subject to the same rediscount rate in the central
danking system whether the borrower, perhaps a resident of a western city, placed the
paper at his local bank or with an eastern bank.
The apparent false premise in such statements would seem to be contradicted, too,
by the provisions in the law for reserve banks coming to one another’s aid. Inter-dis.
rrict borrowing assumed large proportions in 1920 and 1921, reaching a maximum in
one month of $260,000,000. If it had not been for these transactions between the
reserve banks, with examples of some reserve banks receiving aid maintaining redis-
count rates lower than the rates of the lending banks, one of the reserve banks would
{Continued on page 21)
Differing
Rediscount Rates
Partially Developed
Regions
Actual Rates
Inter-District Loans