CHAPTER XIV
THE BOOM OF 1919 AND THE SUBSEQUENT
DEPRESSION IN RELATION TO PUBLIC
BORROWING
‘Statistics are, indeed, often powerful in the destruction of error. They seldom
show precisely what share of any event is to be attributed to each of the many
influences bearing upon the time and in preceding years. But they often prove
that a result which has been attributed to a certain cause cannot have been produced
9y it, and such destructive work is a considerable factor in scientific progress,’—
AvrRED MarsuarL, Money, Credit, and Commerce.
‘It was a common error to mistake these factors for the real causes of the crisis.
They were results only, and arose through the inevitable delay in readjusting the
varied elements of costs and expenditure to a new situation forced upon the economic
system by the dramatic fall in wholesale prices. But they have led men to con-
“lusions regarding the regulation of wages and industrial conditions, the functions
of trade unions and labour organization, and the problems of public finance which
might materially affect the future of government and industry.’—Prof. D. B. Cop-
LAND, The Trade Depression tn dustralia.
THE vicissitudes of business in Australia since 1918 have been
commonly ascribed to the ‘aftermath of war’ and ‘war-time
inflation’; and this current belief has found a certain measure
of support in the utterances of economists and business leaders.
This belief, with its implication that the exigencies of national
orisis excuse all economic sins, has been responsible for a some-
what fatalistic attitude in the face of serious difficulties, and
for an apathetic state of mind which regards the situation as an
inescapable reaction from the excesses of the war years, with
particular emphasis on inflation. The close correspondence
between economic conditions in Australia and in Europe has
fostered this too-ready acceptance of a theory concerning the
economic consequences of war. Such a comfortable shelving
of the responsibility for our present economic disabilities,
however, finds little support in the evidence so far adduced as
to the effects of excessive borrowing abroad. It is, in fact, an
attitude to be vigorously resisted rather than complacently
condoned ; and it is believed that the present examination will
place the years of depression since 1921 in rather a different
light.
The joint effect of inflation and heavy borrowing had, after
1916, been plainly evident, and the outcome had been an era of