202 THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
The war period of 1917-19, which changed so many finan- 
cial customs and practices everywhere, made its peculiar exi- 
gencies felt inside Wall Street security loan envelopes. While 
during these years the railroad business was hazardous and 
unprofitable, the enormous production inaugurated by the war 
imparted great strength to many industrial shares. Thus the 
“regular loan” came during this period to consist of rail and 
industrial shares in about equal proportions. Likewise, the 
rise of industrial shares in comparative merit and activity gave 
rise to more “all-industrial” loans, previously thought a rather 
hazardous type. 
ALL-INDUSTRIAL LoaN or $100,000 
Based entirely on industrial stocks. Margin 30% 
300 General Motors at 72........... 
300 Pan American Petroleum at 59..... 
300 Liggett & Meyers at 8s.... 
200 Crucible Steel at g2...... 
100 Sears-Roebuck at 155......... 
100 American Telephone & Telegraph at 207............ 
100 Anaconda Copper at 106. . reeves 
1.400 
$ 21,600 
17,700 
25,500 
18,400 
15,500 
20,700 
10.600 
$130.000 
Since the war, the “all-rail” loan has become very rare, and 
the “all-industrial” loan the commonest of all types. It is also 
‘rue that in many loans, bonds are introduced, and some loans 
are made entirely on bond cellateral. 
To the lender on securities, the quality and price-stability 
©f the collateral are naturally important, and he may refuse to 
accept issues which he considers weak or overpriced, either 
altogether or unless unusually heavy margins are provided. 
But both by demanding high margins and by pricing collateral 
below market prices to suit himself, the lender can in practice 
protect himself very completely even when lending upon 
thoroughly speculative securities whose price fluctuations may 
be great. Therefore to the lender marketability is highly essen- 
tial, since to protect his loan he must be able to sell the collat- 
eral speedily. This is the reason why a lender will sometimes