APPENDIX
602
After the war, the first money shortage since the foundation of
the Federal Reserve system occurred in 1919-20, due to congestion
of unsold Liberty Bonds in the banks and enormous mercantile and
manufacturers’ loans employed to carry huge inventories at high
prices. The stock market broke in November, 1919, when even 32%
was charged on a few call loans. During subsequent months, call
money renewed at rates from 109, to even 15%.
During 1928-29 the mounting totals of loans on securities, together
with the restrictive credit policies of the Federal Reserve system, led
to very high call loan rates. But there was not an actual shortage
of credit, owing to the great unused potentialties for expanding credit
still possessed by the Reserve system, as indicated by its high reserve
ratios. Actually, the 1929 panic broke out when call money had become
relatively easy, and during the panic no credit shortage was felt. After
the panic, credit at once became extraordinarily easy and interest rates
fell to the lowest levels in years.
(VIId) Corners, like money shortages, are relative rather than
absolute, and sometimes it is difficult to state just where they begin.
Most corners are really accidental in origin. If each Stock Exchange
commission office (including branches) should at one time sell only
too shares of a certain stock short, a total “short interest” of about
1,200,000 shares could thus be created. This imaginary situation also
leaves out of all account the large number of non-member firms who
are correspondents of Stock Exchange houses. If only 1,000,000
shares of the stock were outstanding or available for delivery on the
Exchange, a technical corner would thus be created without any
anticipation of it by anyone. This is the reason why very large issues
of stock are more immune from corners than small issues.
The test of a corner on the Exchange is whether the given stock
can be freely borrowed. If so, the free and open market has not been
destroyed. The Business Conduct Committee may investigate the
case, by calling on Exchange members to report to it at once their
several positions and commitments in the issue. If no one is attempt-
ing unfairly to exploit the situation to his own advantage, the stock
will not be stricken from the list and the situation will as a rule soon
right itself by the ordinary course of market purchases and sales. As
a general thing, company officials have no desire to see their stock
cornered, even if they are nettled by previous price declines due to
short sales, and almost always they cooperate fully with the Stock
Exchange in maintaining a free market for their issues.
Occasionally, however, either persons connected with the manage-
ment of a company or operators entirely outside its management may