APPENDIX
619
the next ‘delivery day’ following the date of the transaction and
shall be ‘flat’ thereafter unless otherwise agreed.”
(Xb) The more rapid growth on the New York Stock Exchange
of its share as compared with its bond business during recent years,
is revealed by the following statistics:
ToTAL LISTING ON THE EXCHANGE
Issues
January 1, 1925..... 1,333
[anuary I, 1926..... 1,367
january I, 1927..... 1,420
January 1, 1928..... 1,491
January 1, 1929..... 1,534
January I, 1930..... 1,543
Par
Value
.000,000
omitted)
$35,445
36,995
37,900
36, 881
48,588
49,0588
BoNDs
Market
Value
1000,00¢
omitt--
~
Total
Shares
.000,00C
MM -
STOCKS
Market
Value
(000,000
ymitend)
n
2
REPORTED SALES ON THE EXCHANGE
(925.
1926...
1927.
1928. ...
[929. .
Bonds
+, 398,346,045
3,029,684,699
3,321,527,600
2,939,627,750
2,020,1316,700
Shares
452,211,399
449,103,253
576,990,875
920,550,032
[,124,990,980
CHAPTER XI
The Security Collateral Loan Market
(XIa) In such leading European financial centers as London,
Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam and Vienna, the security loan markets are
less effectively organized than in New York. This is shown by the
personal character of such loans abroad, as compared with their almost
complete impersonality here. Abroad, in fact, there is little collateral
diversification, little or no power of substitution, no units for the
loans, and no public or open market for contracting them. Such
loans are, in fact, treated merely as advances against securities. A
borrowing stock broker or security dealer is accorded what amounts
to a “line of credit” with a maximum limit; he utilizes this credit by
simply sending to the lender whatever securities he has handy. Usually
security margins over the loan amounts are required, but the lender
abroad is so poorly protected as compared with New York lenders
that he is usually very conservative concerning the character of
collateral—a factor which of course makes new industrial security
Aotations all the more difficult there. The length of such loans is
