RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES

international courts. The individual action of the State cannot be upheld
as against the presumption of fairness and regularity which the international
community attributes to the judicial functions of the various States. The
solution might consist in organizing a special body to establish whether the
facts warrant proceedings to fix international responsibility. This body
could not, of course, pass upon the fundamental issues involved. It should
determine, in the first place, whether or not the facts may justify a State
in bringing up for discussion the regularity or fairness of a court decision.
The usual current practice tends to solve the difficulties of this important
issue by means of treaties. There is a form of treaty, like that between
Poland and Switzerland (March 7, 1925), which submits to international
adjudication certain matters which international law leaves entirely to the
national jurisdiction of the States. But when under the municipal law one
of these matters comes within the jurisdiction of the local courts, the defendant
 may object to the international jurisdiction until a final decision has
been rendered by the competent national court. There is another type of
treaty, as for instance the one between Switzerland and Spain, which submits
 all controversies, regardless of their nature, to the international jurisdiction.
 However, if any of these should come within the jurisdiction of
the national judiciary, the defendant may object to the institution of international
 proceedings until a final local decision has been rendered in the
matter.

(d) The definition of a denial of justice has been very ambiguous.
John Bassett Moore feared that it might not be possible to set forth some
formula that would actually serve to solve the problems arising in concrete
cases. De Lapradelle and Politis remarked that the complicated and uncertain
 characteristics of a denial of justice seem to challenge all definition.
Actual practice, however, has greatly contributed to bring about a relatively
clear conception of the doctrine. One of the difficulties is due to the fact
that such a broad conception used to be entertained in connection with the
denial of justice that it comprised the action of all the State organs. As
regards the action of the judicial authorities, the doctrine included the typical
cases of denial of justice, as well as those involving deficient procedure or a
manifest injustice. Another serious difficulty arose from the confusion between
 the possible error of the decision which does not entail responsibility,
and unusual deficiency or manifest injustice. No lines of distinction can
very well be drawn between the various phases of a denial of justice, except
by careful consideration of the facts of each concrete case. If the question
involved is the lack of the indispensable organs for the proper administration
of justice, or lack of laws authorizing the legal actions required by international
 law, or refusal of access to the courts, or wrongful delay, or decisions
 influenced by ill-will against all foreigners as such or against the