fullscreen: A critical dissertation on the nature, measures and causes of value

2, 
ON THE NATURE 
nerality of men, but as qualities of external 
objects. 
It is precisely in the same way, that value is 
regarded as a quality belonging to the objects 
around us. We lose sight of the feeling of the 
mind, and consider only the power which the 
object possesses of exciting it, as something 
external and independent. 
It is not, however, a simple feeling of esteem, 
to which the name of value, as used by the po- 
litical economist, can be given. When we con- 
sider objects in themselves, without reference 
to each other; the emotion of pleasure or sa- 
tisfaction, with which we regard their utility or 
beauty, can scarcely take the appellation of 
value. It is only when objects are considered 
together as subjects of preference or exchange, 
that the specific feeling of value can arise. 
When they are so considered, our esteem for 
one object, or our wish to possess it, may be 
equal to, er greater, or less than our esteem for 
another: it may, for instance, be doubly as 
great, or, in other words, we would give one
	        
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